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Our lobbying industry is widely criticized as a pay-for-play system that prioritizes
powerful interests at the expense of the common good. Legislative efforts at lobbying
reform, however, raise fundamental questions under the First Amendment,
particularly where lobbying regulations operate to restrict lobbying activity directly.
Recent scholarship into the First Amendment Petition Clause, however, offers new
insights into what the First Amendment means for lobbying and public engagement
with lawmakers more generally. As the history of petitioning in England, the
American colonies, and Congress illustrates, the right to petition protected more than
simply a form of political speech but rather a quasi-procedural right to equal
participation in the lawmaking process.
This Comment adds to this growing literature by considering the history of
petitioning from an institutional perspective and how the Petition Clause may serve
as a guide for structing the lawmaking process. The history of petitioning reveals two
important interests that are central to petitioning’s historical function: the allocation
of government access between competing interests and the provision of information to
lawmakers. This Comment traces these interests and describes how they drove the
development of formal petitioning and how they have consistently informed the
Supreme Court’s Petition Clause jurisprudence. Moving forward, a renewed focus on
access and information can help inform institutional efforts to reform our lobbying
system, as well as doctrinal developments that recognize the government’s interest in
building a more open, equitable, and informed system of engagement with the public.
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“[I]t is essential to liberty that the government in general, should have a
common interest with the people; so it is particularly essential that . . .
[Congress] . . . should have an immediate dependence on, [and] an intimate
sympathy with the people.”

—James Madison1
“We had a hierarchy in my office, in Congress. If you were a lobbyist who
never gave us money, I didn’t talk to you. If you were a lobbyist who gave us
money, I might talk to you.”

—Mick Mulvaney, Former U.S. Representative.2

THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison).
Mick Mulvaney, Acting Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Remarks at the American Bankers
Association
Annual
Conference
11
(Apr.
24,
2018),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4446622-Transcript-Mulvaney-ABA-Conference-424-2018.html [https://perma.cc/G67X-9LD9].
1
2
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INTRODUCTION
In politics, access is everything. Who gets access to lawmakers and who
doesn’t drives the legislative agenda, defines the parameters of the debate,
and decides policy outcomes.3 Over the last several decades, a widespread
informal lobbying industry has emerged as a means of buying and selling
access to lawmakers. This system has been criticized as a pay-for-play scheme
that advances powerful interests at the expense of the public good,4 if not a
perverse form of “legalized bribery,”5 and has contributed to historically low
public faith in Congress.6 Attempts to regulate lobbying, however, raise
fundamental questions under the First Amendment.
The First Amendment’s Speech Clause prohibits laws “abridging the
freedom of speech.”7 With this is mind, several commentators have assumed that
3 A vast literature has emerged describing lobbying and influence in terms of access, including
the role of access in legislative agenda-setting and in securing substantive outcomes. See, e.g., David
Austen-Smith, Allocating Access for Information and Contributions, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 277, 277
(1998) (describing the link between campaign contributions, access to lawmakers, and policy
outcomes); Christopher Cotton, Pay-to-Play Politics: Informational Lobbying and Contribution Limits
When Money Buys Access, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 369, 369 (2012) (same); Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey
M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball & Beth L. Leech, Money, Priorities, and Stalemate: How
Lobbying Affects Public Policy, 13 ELECTION L.J. 194, 201-05 (2014) (discussing the impact of lobbying
on the agenda-setting stage of the lawmaking process and noting how access may amplify or foreclose
certain voices); Laura Langbein, Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence, 48 J. POL. 1052, 1053
(1986) (“Only access, or some other form of direct or indirect communication, can translate
[campaign contributions] into influence.”); David C. Kimball, Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M.
Berry, Marie Hajnacki, Beth Leech & Bryce Summary, Who Cares About the Lobbying Agenda?, 1 INT.
GRPS. & ADVOC. 5-25 (2012) (discussing the influence of lobbying access at the agenda-setting stage
of the lawmaking process). See also infra Section I.A.
4 See, e.g., Fighting Special Interest Lobbyist Power over Public Policy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Sept. 27, 2017, 9:02 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2017/09/
27/439675/fighting-special-interest-lobbyist-power-public-policy [https://perma.cc/9HHT-7RDR]
(“[L]opsided lobbying and campaign spending undermines the democratic process . . . by aligning
the congressional agenda with the special interest lobbyists’ agenda . . . .”).
5 See, e.g., Jimmy Williams, I Was a Lobbyist for More than 6 Years. I Quit. My Conscience Couldn’t
Take it Anymore, VOX (Jan. 5, 2018, 7:46 AM), https://www.vox.com/first-person/2017/6/29/15886936/
political-lobbying-lobbyist-big-money-politics [https://web.archive.org/web/20210314233118/https://
www.vox.com/first-person/2017/6/29/15886936/political-lobbying-lobbyist-big-money-politics]
(describing the author’s own lobbying experience as “[y]ears of legalized bribery” that “exposed [him]
to the worst elements of our country’s political workings”).
6 See Justin McCarthy, U.S. Confidence in Organized Religion Remains Low, GALLUP (July 8, 2019),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/259964/confidence-organized-religion-remains-low.aspx [https://perma.cc/
TT32-FXFS] (reporting that only 11% of those surveyed reported having “a great deal” or “quite a lot”
of confidence in Congress, which has remained at the bottom of the list of surveyed institutions since
2019); Little Public Support for Reductions in Federal Spending, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/little-public-support-for-reductions-in-federal-spending
[https://perma.cc/3C4K-5SZ5] (reporting that public trust in the federal government remains
historically low, with just 17% of those surveyed reporting that they trust the federal government to do
what is right “just about always” or “most of the time”).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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when lobbyists meet with lawmakers, their activity constitutes a form of political
speech protected by the First Amendment.8 The Supreme Court, however, has
yet to hold that this is the case.9 Nevertheless, lower courts considering lobbying
reform laws have tended to apply strict scrutiny, often fatally so, following the
Court’s recent campaign finance decisions.10 But even if the speech of lobbyists
is protected by the First Amendment, the issue is complicated by the fact that
lobbying also involves the active participation of lawmakers who control access
to themselves and make decisions about which political speech they will and will
not listen to.11 The Speech Clause is silent as to how these decisions should be
made or whether individuals or lobbyists have any right to lawmaker access.
The First Amendment’s Petition Clause, on the other hand, protects “the
right . . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”12 On its face,
this Clause protects both a form of political speech—petitions—and a
particular process for communicating with the government. The precise nature
and function of the Petition Clause, however, remains unclear. Compared to
other First Amendment rights, the right to petition has received relatively little
attention from scholars,13 and the Supreme Court’s limited petition
jurisprudence has largely conflated the right to petition with the right to
speech, having gone so far as to describe the two as “cut from the same cloth.”14
This view has contributed to claims that—like it or not—the First Amendment
prohibits the government from regulating lobbying or access in any way.15 This
8 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 191,
196 (2012) (noting that “[s]peech aimed at influencing government action is core political speech”
that implicates the First Amendment right to Free Speech); Alan B. Morrison, Introduction:
Lobbyists—Saints or Sinners?, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 1 (2008) (“[T]he right to lobby is the right
to petition the government for grievances, which is explicitly protected by the First Amendment.”).
9 See Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2016)
(noting that, despite dicta hinting at constitutional limits on lobbying regulation, the Supreme
Court has not addressed the issue squarely).
10 See Hasen, supra note 8, 214–16 (discussing a series of recent cases in which the Supreme
Court expressed skepticism about the “constitutionality of limits on the use of money to influence
political outcomes,” including Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
11 See, e.g., JOHN MARK HANSEN, GAINING ACCESS: CONGRESS AND THE FARM LOBBY, 19191981, at 22-25 (1991) (laying out a theory of access as lawmaker behavior); McKinley, supra note 9, at
1201-02 (2016) (noting that Congress has established a “de facto” process for allocating access to itself).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13 See, e.g., Anita Hodgkiss, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569,
569 n.1 (1987) (noting the scarcity of commentary on the right to petition even within First
Amendment scholarship); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a
Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 16, 16 n.2 (1993) (same).
14 McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985).
15 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13
ELECTION L.J. 160, 163 (2014) (“Lobbying is an aspect of the freedoms of speech, press, association,
and petition protected by the [C]onstitution.”); Hasen, supra note 8, at 196 (“Speech aimed at
influencing government action is core political speech, and it would certainly be . . .
unconstitutional . . . to bar individuals from lobbying to change government action.”); Morrison,
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conflation, however, discounts the nearly eight-hundred-year history of the
right to petition as it was exercised in England, in colonial governments, and
in the United States Congress well into the twentieth century. In recent years,
scholars have unearthed a wealth of historical evidence surrounding the right
to petition.16 This history reveals that the right to petition protected not only
the speech contained within a petition but also an individual right to equal and
meaningful participation in the lawmaking process.17
This Comment builds upon this recent scholarship by considering the
history of petitioning from an institutional perspective. Historically,
petitioning played a central role in structuring the lawmaking process and
provided important benefits to both the governed and the government.18 This
history not only helps to distinguish petitioning from ordinary political
speech, but it also reveals two distinct institutional interests that provide
independent rationales for legislative efforts at lobbying reform.
First, petitioning provided a mechanism for allocating access to
lawmakers. Unlike our current lobbying system, in which access to lawmakers
is allocated informally, petitioning made use of formal and institutionalized
processes to bring matters to the attention of lawmakers.19 And while today
access often goes disproportionately to the economically or politically
powerful, the historical right to petition was far more egalitarian, extending
to all people—even the unenfranchised—without regard for their wealth or
political power.20 Any individual or group could, simply by drafting and filing
a formal petition, have their grievances heard and considered on equal
supra note 8, at 1 (“[T]he right to lobby is the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances, which is explicitly protected by the First Amendment.”).
16 See generally Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition the Government
for Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986) (looking to records from the legislature of the
Connecticut Colony and the early U.S. Congress to detail the controversy over the interpretation of
the right to petition); Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the
Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153 (1998) (examining documents from colonial legislature
as well as the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the U.S. Constitution,
state constitutions, and the Federalist Papers to interpret the right to petition); McKinley, supra note
9 (excavating colonial documents discussing the Magna Carta, papers from colonial legislatures, and
other Revolutionary-era documents to interpret the right to petition); Eric Schnapper, “Libelous”
Petitions for Redress of Grievances-Bad Historiography Makes Worse Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 303 (1989)
(arguing that the historical analysis contained in McDonald v. Smith is erroneous by examining the
historical record that the Court did not include in its reasoning, including the English Bill of Rights
and Revolutionary-era case law); Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . .”: An Analysis
of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153 (1986) (mining historical
sources from medieval England, the English Civil War, the Glorious Revolution, as well as American
colonial and Revolutionary-era documents); Spanbauer, supra note 13.
17 See infra Section II.A.
18 See infra Part II.
19 See infra Section II.A.
20 See id.
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footing.21 Petitioning thus allocated government access—a highly scarce and
valuable public resource—by providing a quasi-procedural right to be heard.22
Second, petitioning helped provide lawmakers with broad and inclusive
information.23 Historically, formal petitioning served as the primary means
of information gathering in England, the colonies, and the early United
States.24 Petitions provided detailed information which lawmakers otherwise
would have been unable to obtain, apprised lawmakers of the needs and
desires of their constituents, and focused lawmaker attention on highly local
or specialized issues they might otherwise have missed.25 Today, however,
lawmakers are faced with a deluge of information that is largely mediated by
lobbyists and thus disproportionately reflects the interests of the politically
powerful interests they represent.26
This Comment seeks to bring these two interests—access and
information—to the foreground and argues that the right to petition is best
viewed not only as an individual right, but also as a guide for structuring the
government’s engagement with the public. Part I begins by articulating what is
at stake with respect to both access and information by identifying current
challenges with each and discussing how our current lobbying system has
proven insufficient. Next, Part II traces the history of the right to petition
through the lenses of access and information. Part III then discusses how access
and information have influenced the Supreme Court’s Petition Clause doctrine.
Part IV discusses implications for institutional reform and how a renewed focus
on the Petition Clause offers new doctrinal rationales for lobbying regulation.
I. ACCESS AND INFORMATION
In the Supreme Court’s most recent Petition Clause Case, Borough of
Duryea v. Guarnieri, the Court recognized that the right to petition is distinct
from the right to free speech and that “some effort must be made to identify
See infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See id.
See id.
See LORELEI KELLY, NEW AM. FOUND., CONGRESS’ WICKED PROBLEM: SEEKING
KNOWLEDGE INSIDE THE INFORMATION TSUNAMI 4 (2012) (“[Congressional] offices are
overwhelmed with the noise of incoming information, including from constituents, non-profit
advocacy, fact-sheets, lobbying and commercially sponsored analysis.”). It is worth noting the body
of commentary on the role of lobbyists in providing information to lawmakers. See, e.g., FRANK R.
BAUMGARTNER, JEFFREY M. BERRY, MARIE HOJNACKI, DAVID C. KIMBALL & BETH L. LEECH,
LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 55 (2009) (discussing
how lobbyists help lawmakers sort through the bewildering complexity of major policy issues);
Bertrall L. Ross II, Addressing Inequality in the Age of Citizens United, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1120, 1150
(2018) (arguing that regulation of lobbying would reduce the information available to lawmakers).
21
22
23
24
25
26
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the historic and fundamental principles that led to the enumeration of the
right to petition.”27 As the next Part illustrates, the history of petitioning
reveals two vital interests that underly the right to petition: allocating access
to lawmakers and providing lawmakers with broad and inclusive
information.28 As we will see, these interests drove the development of
petitioning as a solution to the institutional challenges of democratic
governance and later influenced the rise of our modern lobbying system as
well.29 Before turning to the history, however, it is worth pausing to examine
these two interests—access and information—in today’s context.
This Part examines how access and information interests operate in the
modern lawmaking process and under our current lobbying system. It begins
by defining access in terms of the attention of lawmakers, a highly scarce
resource that is necessary to achieve policy outcomes and discusses how that
attention is allocated among competing groups. Next, it discusses the
informational needs of lawmakers, the lack of institutional sources of
information, and the reasons why lawmakers increasingly turn to expert but
interested lobbyists for needed information.
A. Allocating Government Access
Public access to government is vital to representative democracy. Outside
of formal elections, engagement with lawmakers is the primary means by
which the public participates in the lawmaking process. Moreover, while
elections decide who will govern and make policy, ongoing engagement with
the public is necessary to ensure that the needs and desires of constituents—
including political minorities and the unenfranchised—are represented.
Demand for access, however, drastically exceeds supply, necessitating some
system of allocation. But what does it mean to allocate access to government?
What exactly is being allocated, what interests are implicated, and what
method does the First Amendment favor?
When we speak of government access, what we are really referring to is
the attention of lawmakers and other officials. As avenues for speech have
become cheap and the amount of available information has exploded,
economists have increasingly focused on attention as an increasingly scarce
and thus valuable resource.30 Much has been written on the implications of
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 394 (2011).
See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.C.
See Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organization for an Information-Rich World, in COMPUTERS,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40-41 (Martin Greenberger ed., 1971) (“[I]n
an information-rich world, the wealth of information means a dearth of something else: a scarcity
of . . . the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention
and a need to allocate that attention”).
27
28
29
30
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attention scarcity for businesses and consumers,31 and for public discourse at
large.32 The issue takes on a different character, however, when applied to
lawmakers. A significant body of literature has developed to describe how
interest groups compete for lawmaker attention and how lawmakers choose
to allocate their own attention.33 While some models of lobbying describe the
process as an attempt to buy policy outcomes34 or to provide lawmakers with
information,35 attention-based models of lobbying focus instead on the efforts
of interest groups to capture a lawmaker’s limited attention, which is often a
necessary first step before any information exchange or policy consideration
can occur.36 Like any scarce resource, the attention of lawmakers is highly
valuable, and interest groups continue to invest heavily in obtaining it.37
The allocation of lawmaker attention has real consequences for the
lawmaking process. The legislative agenda is largely driven by access and
attention. Long before a vote can be had or a debate held, issues must first be
defined and selected for serious consideration, and it is in these early agendasetting stages that lawmaker attention is most significant.38 By influencing
31 See generally, e.g., TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET
INSIDE OUR HEADS (2016) (describing how shifts in technology and business practices have
increasingly sought to consume human attention).
32 See generally, e.g., Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 117 MICH. L. REV. 547 (2018)
(discussing that accompanying the flood of speech on the Internet, attention of listeners is scarce).
33 See, e.g., Austen-Smith, supra note 3, at 277 (describing a lobbying model in which lobbyists
make political contributions in order to obtain access, whereupon they influence policy outcomes by
providing valuable information); Cotton, supra note 3, at 369 (describing a lobbying model in which
wealthier interest groups obtain greater access and in which lawmakers grant access strategically to
engage in political rent-seeking).
34 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS AND
A PLAN TO STOP IT 88 (2011); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. 833, 833 (1994).
35 See, e.g., Richard Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 69, 69 (2006) (laying out a model of lobbying as one of providing costly information to
likeminded policymakers in order to promote desired outcomes); David Austen-Smith & John R.
Wright, Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator’s Vote, 9 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 229, 234 (1992)
(describing lobbying as primarily a form of strategic information transmission to lawmakers).
36 See, e.g., Christopher Cotton, Competing for Attention: Lobbying Time-Constrained Politicians,
18 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 642, 643 (2016) (noting that “[d]rafting, introducing, and promoting
legislation are time consuming” and that lawmakers are “constrained . . . in their ability to learn
about and implement policy proposals”).
37 See, e.g., Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to
Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 545, 553 (2016) (finding
that lawmakers are three to four times more likely to grant access to political donors than to nondonors); Langbein, supra note 3, at 1059-61, 1061 tbl.3 (finding that the cost of lawmaker time ranged
from $6,400 for less than twenty-five minutes to $72,300 for an hour); Richard Hall & Frank Wyman,
Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 797 (1990) (assessing the relationship between PAC contributions and access).
38 See Baumgartner et al., supra note 3, at 201 (“Lobbying may have a stronger impact on the
agenda-setting stage of the policy process, when government officials determine which issues merit
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how lawmaker attention is allocated, it is possible to amplify certain voices
and foreclose others.39 Indeed, the priorities of Congress tend to show a
greater correlation with those of lobbyists than with those of the general
public.40 Moreover, because lawmaker attention is a prerequisite for change,
a lack of attention to a given topic operates to entrench the status quo.41
The attention of individual lawmakers is a highly scarce resource. First and
foremost, lawmakers are human beings subject to the same constraints and
demands on attention as the rest of us. Each has only twenty-four hours in a
day, only a fraction of which can reasonably be directed to the business of
lawmaking.42 The largest constraint on lawmaker attention, however, is the
constant need to fundraise.43. The 2020 election was the most expensive in
U.S. history, with spending more than doubling that in 2016.44 The average
costs of winning an individual House or Senate race were $1.3 million and $10.4
million, respectively.45 The need to raise ever-increasing amounts of money
each election cycle means that lawmakers must spend more and more of their
time and attention soliciting donations.46 There has been no comprehensive
survey of exactly how much time lawmakers spend on fundraising, but various
anecdotal sources place the figure for members of Congress at anywhere from
twenty to eighty percent of a lawmaker’s work week.47
significant attention and which issues can be safely ignored. Attention is a critical but limited
resource in the policymaking process.”).
39 Id. (“Lobbying may affect whose voices are amplified and whose voices are simply not heard
when vying for the attention of government officials.”).
40 Id. at 201-02.
41 Id. at 205 (“[D]efenders of the status quo are not trying to attract attention to the policy
they hope will remain unchanged. . . . In contrast, inattention from members of Congress . . .
provides few if any benefits for sides challenging the status quo.”).
42 See id. at 204. (“[E]ven if . . . government ha[s] significant resources of time, staff, and money
at [its] disposal, these resources are inadequate to the many demands . . . placed upon them. All actors
in Washington are faced with more issues they could spend time on than they have hours in the day.”).
43 See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Time Suck: How the Fundraising Treadmill Diminishes Effective Governance,
42 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 271, 272 (2018) (discussing in detail the pressures of congressional fundraising).
44 2020 Election to Cost $14 Billion, Blowing Away Spending Records, OPENSECRETS.ORG, (Oct.
28, 2020, 1:51 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/10/cost-of-2020-election-14billionupdate [https://perma.cc/H54N-9U4A].
45 See, e.g., Soo Rin Kim, The Price of Winning Just Got Higher, Especially in the Senate,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, (Nov. 9, 2016, 5:10 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/11/the-priceof-winning-just-got-higher-especially-in-the-senate [https://perma.cc/VU2X-XZGH].
46 See generally Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 43.
47 See CONG. MGMT. FOUND. & SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT., LIFE IN
CONGRESS: THE MEMBER PERSPECTIVE 19 (2013), https://www.congressfoundation.org/
storage/documents/CMF_Pubs/life-in-congress-the-member-perspective.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
V9TD-FFDB] (surveying twenty-five House members and finding that these members spent
approximately 20% of their time on campaign fundraising activities); Ryan Grim & Sabrina Siddiqui,
Call Time For Congress Shows How Fundraising Dominates Bleak Work Life, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/call-time-congressional-fundraising_n_2427291 [https://perma.cc/
KFV2-4CMX] (discussing a memo to incoming House democrats describing a ten-hour workday with
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Time and attention spent fundraising come at the expense of all other
legislative tasks.48 Members of Congress, for example, are prohibited from
fundraising in the congressional offices,49 requiring them to physically move to
separate office spaces to solicit donations.50 More fundamentally, lawmakers
engaged in fundraising are limited in their ability to multi-task or pay any
meaningful attention at all to other matters.51 Fundraising thus reduces the total
amount of attention that can be devoted to other legislative tasks, such as
drafting legislation, participating in hearings and debates, and spending time
with constituents.52 The pressure to raise funds also offers those with money a
way to cut to the front of the attention line and speak directly with lawmakers.53
And when lawmakers run out of time to fundraise themselves, lobbyists often
step in to organize fundraisers on their behalf or to bundle donations from

four hours dedicates to “call time” and another hour dedicated to fundraisers and other campaign
work); Shane Goldmacher, Former Senate Leader Says Senators Spent Two-Thirds of Time Asking for
Money, NAT’L J. (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/63463/former-senate-leader-sayssenators-spent-two-thirds-time-asking-money [perma.cc/FP2F-E6HE]; Paul Blumenthal, Leaked
Memo Tells Senate Candidate to Spend 80 Percent of Her Time Raising Money, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/michelle-nunn-fundraising_n_5628018 [https://perma.cc/QR8E688G] (discussing a leaked memo advising Georgia Democratic Senate candidate Michelle Nunn to
spend up to 80% of her time fundraising); Memorandum from Diane Feldman, President, Feldman
Grp. to The Nunn Team (Michelle Nunn, Candidate for U.S. Senate) (Dec. 9, 2013),
https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/235287519?accesskey=key7XLZhUlmcqs8zb0ft3xs&allowshare=tr
ue&escape=false&viewmode=scroll [https://perma.cc/BWP3-VX3E].
48 See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 43, at 293-96 (describing the inability of lawmakers to
multitask and observing that “expecting someone to legislate and talk on the phone at the same time
seems a tall—if not impossible—order”).
49 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 302, 116 Stat. 81, 96 (2002)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 607).
50 See, e.g., Nick Penniman & Wendell Potter, Nation on the Take: Dialing for Dollars in “D.C.’s
Sweatshops”, HUFFPOST (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/nickpenniman/nation-onthe-take-dialin b_9787106.html [https://perma.cc/BER2-YS3C] (“Former representative Dennis
Cardoza, a California Democrat, compared his party’s call center to a sweatshop with thirty-inchwide cubicles set up for the sole purpose of begging for money.”).
51 See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 43, at 293-296 (discussing the ability of lawmakers to multitask based on recent cognitive science literature).
52 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign
Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1312 (1994)
(noting that candidates would be able to spend more time in their home district were it not for
fundraising pressures); Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to
Campaign Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 33 (2014) (“The main problem of campaign
money on the federal level—aside from the huge time commitment for Members of Congress, who
spend so much time dialing for dollars that there is little time for legislative business—is that is
skews legislative priorities.”).
53 See MARTIN SCHRAM, SPEAKING FREELY: FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TALK
ABOUT MONEY IN POLITICS 4 (1995) (quoting Representative Romano Mazzoli) (“People who
contribute get the ear of the member and the ear of the staff. They have the access—and access is it.
Access is power. Access is clout. That’s how this thing works.”).
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clients.54 Thus fundraising both exacerbates the scarcity of lawmaker attention
and operates to allocate that attention disproportionately to the wealthy.
It is not only the attention of each individual lawmaker that is scarce, but also
the total amount of available lawmaker attention. As of 2018, the U.S. House of
Representatives had one voting member per roughly 747,000 Americans, by far
the greatest discrepancy among industrialized democracies.55 As the number of
constituents-per-representative increases, so too does the demand for attention,
while supply in both the House and Senate have remained static since 1929.56
Moreover, as new technologies, industries, and social challenges have emerged,
the number and complexity of issues faced by Congress has also increased.57 Thus
there are demands on lawmakers’ attention from both an increasing number of
constituents and an increasing number of issues.
Under our current system, the task of allocation is largely left to
lawmakers themselves, who control their own offices and staffs and decide
which meetings to take and which issues to consider.58 How, then, should
individual lawmakers or a body such as Congress allocate access to
themselves? While our current lobbying system allocates lawmaker attention
informally and disproportionately in favor of the wealthy and politically
powerful, the history of formal petitioning offers an alternative vision in
which the legislative agenda is driven by the public, the process is largely
facilitated by formal channels and institutions, and access is allocated on an
equal basis to all parties without regard to political power.59 If the First
Amendment is to be considered a guiding principle, then the Constitution
seems to favor the latter.
B. Lawmakers’ Need for Information
Lawmaking is a complicated process, and in order to do their jobs
effectively, lawmakers require and constantly seek out information.60
54 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 34, at 113 (“As one lobbyist put it expressly, ‘I spend a huge
among of my time fundraising . . . A huge amount.’ That behavior has been confirmed to me by
countless others, not so eager to be on the record.”).
55 See Drew DeSilver, U.S. Population Keeps Growing, but House of Representatives is Same Size as
in Taft Era, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (May 31, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/05/31/u-s-population-keeps-growing-but-house-of-representatives-is-same-size-as-intaft-era [https://perma.cc/4UQD-SWPT].
56 Id.; see also DAVID C. HUCKABEE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 95-791 GOV, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: SETTING THE SIZE 435 (1995).
57 See infra Section II.C.
58 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1201 (noting that under our current lobbying system Congress
“spend[s] resources and afford[s] informal process to the public”).
59 See infra Part II.
60 See Paul Burstein & C. Elizabeth Hirsh, Interest Organizations, Information, and Policy Innovation
in the U.S. Congress, 22 SOCIO. F. 174, 177 (2007) (noting lawmakers’ “constant search for information”).
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Generally speaking, lawmakers need two kinds of information: information
about the political consequences of policy decisions—political information—
and substantive information about particular policy issues—policy
information.61 In order to effectively represent constituents and to improve
reelection chances, lawmakers have a vested interest in understanding the
policy preferences of those they represent. This includes knowing which
issues matter to constituents, how intensely they matter, and which positions
on those issues the lawmaker ought to take.62 This is true whether a lawmaker
is interested in representing the interests of their entire constituency or
simply those of their donors. In order to achieve policy success, lawmakers
also require technical and policy expertise, particularly in the context of novel
or highly complex topics.63 Such policy information may take the form of data
and statistics, but also facts, arguments, and predictions.64
In order to obtain such information, lawmakers have three options: they
may obtain the information themselves, request it from a public informationgathering institution, or rely on outside parties to provide it.65 Given the
relatively limited resources of lawmakers and their staffs, the first option is
likely not feasible.66 The second option is more promising, particularly for
bodies such as Congress, which has at its disposal a bureaucratic workforce of
thousands of specialized experts spread across various institutions including
the Congressional Research Service, the Congressional Budget Office, and
the Government Accountability Office.67 Such bodies are publicly funded and
provide nonpartisan expert information on a wide variety of topics and are
frequently utilized by Members and Congressional committees.68 The
capacity of these bodies, however, has dramatically decreased since their

61 See Bryan S. McQuide, Information & Interest Group Lobbying in Congress: Policy vs.
Political Information 2 (2007) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).
62 See Burstein & Hirsh, supra note 60, at 177 ([Lawmakers] want to know their constituents’
policy preferences, how much particular issues matter to them, and whether their own actions are
likely to affect constituents’ votes at the next election.”) (internal citations omitted).
63 See John M. De Figueiredo, Lobbying and Information in Politics, 4 BUS. & POL. 125, 125 (2002).
64 Id.
65 See, e.g., Lee Drutman and Steven Teles, Why Congress Relies on Lobbyists Instead of Thinking for Itself,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/when-congress-cantthink-for-itself-it-turns-to-lobbyists/387295 [https://perma.cc/GQ7D-R6UB] (observing that government
can either invest in internal resources to obtain its own knowledge or rely on external experts for
information).
66 See Hall & Deardorff, supra note 35, at 72 (noting the assumption that lawmakers and their
staffs have limited capacity to advance their legislative goals).
67 For a thorough exploration of the Congressional bureaucracy and its role in providing
Congress with nonpartisan expert information, see Jesse M. Cross & Abbe R. Gluck, The
Congressional Bureaucracy, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1541, 1544-45 (2020).
68 See KELLY, supra note 26, at 10-12.

2021]

The Right to Petition as Access and Information

1247

heyday in the 1970s, due in no small part to drastic reductions in legislative
support staff in the 1990s, and have largely not recovered.69
This leaves the third option—outside support. As the history of formal
petitioning demonstrates, for hundreds of years the primary means of
information-gathering by Parliament, colonial assemblies, and Congress was
the petition process, through which interested parties provided both political
and policy information to lawmakers.70 More recently, the Administrative
Procedure Act71 retains a version of this function in the form of notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures, which serves as an invaluable source of
information for administrative agencies.72 Outside of these formal channels,
however, the majority of outside information is provided by lobbyists and
privately-funded research, both of which have grown dramatically over the
past several decades.73 As Hall and Deardorff explain, one way that lobbyists
may influence the lawmaking process is by identifying friendly lawmakers
and “subsidizing” their efforts by providing valuable information related to
specific policy goals.74 Because interest groups tend to be better-resourced
and more highly specialized than generalist lawmakers or legislative support
bodies, lawmakers increasingly rely on these groups for information.75 By
69 See BRYAN D. JONES & FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, THE POLITICS OF ATTENTION: HOW
GOVERNMENT PRIORITIZES PROBLEMS 285-286 (noting that Congress’ capacity to address issues
reached its apex in the 1970s, plateaued, and then declined dramatically following Republican control in
the early 1990s); KELLY, supra note 26, at 11 (noting that Congressional support offices such as CRS have
failed to fully replenish “top level, substantive staff”); Drutman & Teles, supra note 65 (noting that during
this period, legislative support staff was cut by a third, along with the entire Office of Technology
Assessment, thus reducing the capacity of Congress to “acquire, process, and analyze information”).
70 See Section II.B.
71 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59.
72 For a thorough discussion of formal petitioning’s influence on the historical development of
the Administrative Procedure Act and notice and comment rulemaking, see Maggie McKinley,
Petitioning and the Administrative State, 127 YALE L.J. 1538, 1538 (2018).
73 See, e.g., Drutman & Teles, supra note 65 (noting that lobbying expenditures had increased six-fold
from 1983 to 2013, while the number of private Washington-based think tanks tripled from 1970 to 1996).
74 See Hall & Deardorff, supra note 35, at 72-76 (2006) (outlining a lobbying model in which
lobbyists influence policy by providing costly information to strategically selected lawmakers in
order to reduce information-gathering costs and thus subsidize their efforts).
75 See Clare Brock, Partisan Polarization and Corporate Lobbying: Information, Demand, and
Conflict, 10 Int. Grps. & Advoc. (forthcoming 2021) (noting lawmakers’ increased demand for
information from lobbyists); TIMOTHY M. LA PIRA & HERSCHEL F. THOMAS III, REVOLVING
DOOR LOBBYING: PUBLIC SERVICE, PRIVATE INFLUENCE, AND THE UNEQUAL
REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS 51 (2017) (describing lawmakers’ increased reliance on lobbyists
for information and observing that “the government has essentially outsourced its brainpower to the
lobbying community”); Beth L. Leech, Frank R. Baumgartner, Timothy M. La Pira & Nicholas A.
Semanko, Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy, 58 Pol.
Rsch. Q 19, 30 (2005) (noting that lobbying activity has increased in response to the expansion of
government activity); Drutman & Teles, supra note 65 (“Government can invest in resources that
would allow it to acquire . . . specialized knowledge, or it can rely on externally provided experts
with a material stake to help it draft and enact laws. For decades, we have chosen the second.”).
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providing information favorable to their desired outcomes, interests groups
are able to exert considerable influence on the lawmaking process,76
particularly where nobody is funding information in support of the opposing
viewpoint.77 This is possible because both political and policy information are
often difficult and costly to obtain. Constituent preference data, for example,
is often limited or nonexistent at the local level,78 and detailed technical
information, economic modeling, or empirical studies may require substantial
investment to produce.
Due in no small part to the increasing demands on their attention,
lawmakers find themselves subjected to a constant deluge of information
from a range of interest groups vying for influence. Because of their limited
attention, however, it is impossible to fully consider all or even most of this
information, and the task of lawmakers quickly becomes one of sorting
through massive amount of information—much of it produced by groups with
a vested interest—in order to determine policy priorities and make
substantive decisions.79 Missing or lost in this information tsunami are the
voices of groups with fewer resources and the judgment of disinterested
experts, both of which are highly relevant to policy decisions. The increasing
reliance of lawmakers on lobbyists undermines their ability to represent
constituents and make well-informed decisions by forcing them to operate on
skewed and incomplete information.
As this Part illustrates, access and information interests have significant
implications for democratic government and the lawmaking process. How
lawmakers allocate their own attention affects whose voices are heard and
what issues are addressed.80 Likewise, what information lawmakers obtain
and who they obtain it from affects legislative outcomes and provides key
opportunities for influence.81 These are institutional issues in need of
institutional solutions. At present, however, those solutions are lacking. The
task of allocating lawmaker attention is largely left to lawmakers themselves,82
76 See Hall & Deardorff, supra note 35, at 76 (“Lobbyist’s [provision of information] are the
very mechanism of their influence.”).
77 See Drutman & Teles, supra note 65 (arguing that even lawmakers who are suspicious of
information provided by lobbyists may be unlikely to push back due to a lack of information).
78 See Philip J. Ardoin & James C. Garand, Measuring Constituency Ideology in U.S. House Districts:
A Top-Down Simulation Approach, 65 J. POL. 1165, 1166 (2003) (“[D]ata on constituency policy
preferences in legislative districts below the state level are almost impossible to obtain.” (citations
omitted)); Benjamin G. Bishin, Constituency Influence in Congress: Does Subconstitutionality Matter?, 25
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 389, 393 (2000) (“For many issues, constituent preference data is nonexistent.”).
79 See, e.g., KELLY, supra note 26, at 4 (noting the sharp increase in the information that Members
of Congress must sort through and the challenges faced by legislative staff in trying to make sense of it).
80 See supra Section I.A.
81 See supra Section I.B.
82 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1138 (“Today, Congress affords individuals access to lawmakers
and the lawmaking process only on an informal basis”).
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and the capacity of public information-gathering institutions is unable to
keep pace with the informational needs of lawmakers.83 As a result, lawmakers
continue to rely on and provide access to lobbyists whose interests do not
align with those of the public.84 With these contemporary issues in mind, we
now turn to history to examine how petitioning and the right to petition
emerged as an institutional solution to address these same issues.
II. THE HISTORICAL RIGHT TO PETITION
The challenges associated with allocating government access and obtaining
lawmaker information are not new. Long before lawmakers and the public
turned to lobbyists, the formal petition process was the primary means by which
both needs were met.85 This Part explores the historical background of the right
to petition through the lenses of allocation and information and argues that both
have played pivotal roles in the development and evolution of the right.
Historically, the right to petition was a highly egalitarian civil right that
was extended nearly universally, even to the unenfranchised, and established
a formal mechanism by which individuals and groups could submit their
concerns to lawmakers with the expectation that those concerns would be
heard and considered on equal footing.86 The right to petition was also
justified and defended for its value as a source of information to the
government, and for centuries was one of the primary means by which
lawmakers obtained the political and policy information necessary to govern
effectively.87 These interests drove the development of formal petitioning,
and when the formal institutions that supported petitioning faltered in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they also spurred the rise of the
lobbying industry, which has unfortunately failed to meet these needs.88
A. Historical Petitioning as Access
Access to lawmakers is a valuable and scarce resource, and its allocation
has important implications for the lawmaking process. While today interested
parties struggle to be heard amidst a cacophony of other voices, historically
See KELLY, supra note 26, at 4.
See, e.g., Kimball et al., supra note 3, at 10 (comparing the public’s policy priorities with those
of organized lobbying interests and finding the two “largely unrelated”); BAUMGARTNER ET AL.,
supra note 26, at 55 (same).
85 See, e.g., McKinley, supra note 9, at 1154 (noting that at the time of the First Congress, “the
petition process constituted the primary means by which individuals and loose associations engaged
in the lawmaking process”).
86 See infra Section II.A.
87 See infra Section II.B.
88 See infra Section II.C.
83
84
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those seeking redress from their government had to contend not only with
competing interests, but also with the physical obstacle of transporting one’s
message—either personally or in writing—to the proper authority.89 Then, as
now, it was not enough to merely bring a grievance; for it to have any effect
a petition also had to be heard, which required some affirmative action on the
government’s part. This Section traces how Parliament, the colonial
assemblies, and the early Congress addressed the challenge of allocating
lawmaker attention by formalizing access, adopting policies of receiving and
hearing all petitions on equal footing, and establishing institutional
mechanisms to support the steady flow of petitions.
The right to petition arose out of a crisis of access. In 1213, a group of English
barons, displeased with King John’s reign,90 sought an audience to air their
grievances and to petition the King to confirm the charter of rights issued by his
predecessor, Henry I.91 Over the next two years, negotiations were marked by
stalemate and threats of rebellion by the barons, culminating in the barons’
capture of the city of London in 1215.92 Backed into a corner, King John agreed
to meet with the barons a few weeks later, whereupon he signed the Magna Carta
in exchange for the barons’ promises of loyalty and financial support.93
The Magna Carta established the right to petition in two senses. The first
is that the document was itself a petition,94 one that by its very signing set a
precedent that the King could be compelled by his subjects to listen and to
act.95 The second is that the Magna Carta explicitly granted the barons a right
to petition the King for grievances.96 Realizing the Magna Carta’s promise of
89 See Mark, supra note 16, at 2165 n.33 (“Quite apart from political distance, physical distance
and rudimentary transportation made frequent or regular appearances before the King quite difficult
for all but the most local.”).
90 See BRYCE LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
312-15 (2d ed. 1980) (laying out the more salient reasons for the barons’ displeasure).
91 J.C. HOLT, THE MAKING OF MAGNA CARTA 37-39 (1965).
92 The specific details of this period are understandably murky, and the historical literature is
extensive. For two detailed accounts, see id.; LYON, supra note 90, at 310-15. For a more concise
treatment, see NICHOLAS VINCENT, MAGNA CARTA: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 54-71 (2012).
93 See Spanbauer, supra note 13, at 22-23 (“In June of 1215 the barons, as representatives of the
nobility, were granted a personal audience with the King at Runnymede to present their written
petition in exchange for their promise to finance the government.”).
94 See id. at 23 n.41 (“[The Magna Carta] was itself a petition. It established the framework for
petitioning and formalized the procedure by which petitioning would occur.”).
95 See LYON, supra note 90, at 323 (noting that “John’s capitulation proved that kings could be
brought to terms” and that “the importance of the Magna Carta was due chiefly to its enunciation
of the fundamental principle that there was a body of law above the king”).
96 MAGNA CARTA, para. 61 (1215) (Eng.), reprinted and translated in ARTHUR E.
SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS 26 (1965) (“[I]f we [the Royal household] shall break any one of the articles
of the peace or of this security, and, notice of the offense be given to four barons . . . the said four
barons shall . . . petition to have that transgression redressed without delay.”)
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access, however, would prove more difficult, in part because the only
mechanism for enforcement was for the barons to take up arms and compel
the King by force for every violation.97 In the absence of a clear mechanism
for obtaining access, money filled the void, and by the early fourteenth
century a sort of pay-for-play system had emerged in which the Crown
considered petitions in exchange for offers to fund the government.98 As the
financial needs of the Crown increased, the number of petitions that were
accepted increased as well,99 and promises of funding soon became a standard
practice by which nobility and burgesses alike obtained access.100
These petitions were heard by the King’s counselors and other nobles who
were called together periodically in what were then referred to as
“parliaments.”101 As the volume of petitions increased, this institutional
apparatus grew in size and complexity, eventually culminating in the formal
and independent Parliament familiar to us today.102 By the early fourteenth

97 See Spanbauer, supra note 13, at 22 (“[T]he only method of enforcing the Magna Charta [sic]
was baronial seizure of royal land and possessions each time John refused or delayed redress.”);
LYON, supra note 90, at 322 (observing that the Magna Carta had “no adequate enforcement” and
that its “ultimate resort to arms was clumsy and all but legalized the right to rebel”); WILLIAM
SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING
JOHN 129 (2d ed. 1914) (“The only expedient for compelling the King to keep his promises was
clumsy and revolutionary . . . devised not so much to prevent the King from breaking faith as to
punish him when he had done so.”).
98 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ROOTS OF FREEDOM: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 53-54 (1967) (“The king summoned a Parliament when he needed money. On the other
hand, the king’s subjects always had grievances for which they desired redress. What was more
natural than for the two to be tied together . . . ?”).
99 See LYON, supra note 90, at 429-30 (“[T]he earliest function of the representatives was
consent to taxation, that this continued as the chief function, and that through the right of consent
to taxation the representatives won control over the crown.”); Spanbauer, supra note 13, at 23 (“[T]he
petitions these representatives presented on behalf of individuals and their communities were
granted in exchange for commitments to make payments to the crown.”).
100 See LYON, supra note 90, at 424 (noting that the first documented parliament was attended by
nearly seven hundred men including “approximately 50 of the king’s council, 200 spiritual and lay
barons, 150 representatives of the clergy, 74 knights from the counties, and 200 burgesses from the
boroughs”); Spanbauer, supra note 13, at 23 (“Over time, this became the customary practice, and various
segments of society, including knights and burgesses, were also granted audiences by the Crown . . . .”).
101 See 2 WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 285 (1880)
(“[Petitions] furnished abundant work to the permanent council, and the special parliaments were
probably the solemn occasions on which they were presented and discussed.”).
102 See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS
LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 85 (2012) (“As England transitioned from feudalism toward a centralized
bureaucracy, coupled with the emergence of Parliament as a governing institution independent of
the Crown, the status and frequency of petitioning blossomed.”); Smith, supra note 16, at 1155 (“The
breakdown of feudalism and the emergence of a strong sovereign with a centralized bureaucracy . . .
provided the conditions under which petitioning developed its modern characteristics and in turn
shaped the growth of the institutions of government that we know today.”); Spanbauer, supra note
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century under King Edward III, it was common practice to open Parliament
by declaring the King’s willingness to consider petitions,103 and clear
mechanisms were developed for sorting petitions and referring them to
different parts of the government for resolution.104 By the sixteenth century,
petitions largely drove the legislative agenda in the House of Commons105
with distinct processes mediating consideration and referral of petitions,106
along with a Committee of Grievances tasked with this express purpose.107
Increased demands for access to lawmakers were thus resolved through the
creation of formal procedures and institutional supports.
Through formalization and institutionalization, the right to petition
became concrete, affording petitioners real and meaningful access.108 While
the King could refuse to act on a petition, he and his counsellors were
nonetheless obliged to read all petitions that were received.109 This guarantee
of consideration—of attention—was a defining characteristic of the right to
petition as understood by the King and his subjects.110 One reason this came
to be was the quasi-judicial nature of petitions.111 Because petitions sought
redress for both public and private grievances,112 many took the form of
13, at 23 (“[The petitioning process] ultimately led to the development of Parliament, whose advice
and consent was often sought by the royal government before it took action of any magnitude.”).
103 See Smith, supra note 16, at 1155 (“Under Edward III, it became established practice at the opening
of every session of parliament for the chancellor to declare the king’s willingness to consider petitions . . . .”).
104 See 2 RUDOLPH GNIEST, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 14-15 (Philip
A. Ashworth trans., G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1886) (noting that as early as Henry IV, petitions would be
“directed sometimes to the King, sometimes to the King in council, sometime to the King, Lords,
and Commons, sometimes to the Lords and Commons, and sometimes to the Commons alone.”);
STUBBS, supra note 101, at 286, 623 (noting that “the machinery for receiving and considering such
petitions as came from private individuals or separate communities was perfected” under Edward I,
who had established a system of delegating certain petitions to those courts “to which the matter in
question properly belonged”).
105 See Mark, supra note 16, at 2167 (“[Petitions] quickly came to dominate Parliament’s
calendar—indeed, they often became the legislative agenda.”)
106 See id. at 2167 n.42 (noting that the house of Commons “had become the receiver of most petitions”
and had “instituted processes for considering petitions in committee or referring them to the courts”)
107 See 1 WILLIAM R. ANSON, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION 311 (1886)
(noting the 1571 appointment of “[a] Committee of Grievances, to which petitions were referred”).
108 See Mark, supra note 16, at 2165 (noting that petitions were “the most convenient and the
most effective method of calling attention to a grievance”).
109 Id. at 2168 (noting that “subjects came to expect that their petitions would be received and heard”).
110 See id. at 2168-70 (discussing the expectation that all petitions would be received and heard
and how this reflected a “web of mutual obligation” by which the people recognized the legitimate
authority of the Crown to grant petitions in exchange for the King’s acknowledgment of his own
duty to hear his subjects).
111 See Colin Leys, Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 3 POL. STUD. 45, 45
(1955) (“It is clear that originally petitioning was a quasi-judicial institution.”); Mark, supra note 16,
at 2168 (noting that Parliament’s sense of obligation to hear all petitions “can be explained in part
by the quasi-judicial origins of the instrument and the quasi-judicial role of Parliament”).
112 See Mark, supra note 16, at 2166-67 (describing both public and private petitions in England).
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disputes which might be resolved by either a court or a private bill.113
Parliament, however, drew no formal distinctions between petitions for
public grievances and those seeking private redress, and so treated all the
same.114 Another reason was that Parliament had come to condition funding
on the King’s consideration and redress of petitions.115 As a result, not only
did the King have a financial incentive to respond to petitions,116 but
Parliament also had a political incentive to accept more petitions to expand
its own power.117 Over time, the consistent practice of considering all
petitions evolved into a sense of obligation on the part of the government.118
As petitioning became more formal and institutionalized, the access it
provided became more egalitarian. While the first petitions were largely
secured by nobility,119 by the thirteenth and fourteen centuries a wide range
of players participated in the petitioning process, including merchants,
scholars, and even groups who lacked the right to vote, such as prisoners.120
In the seventeenth century, the right to petition was designated as an
individual right by King James I,121 and subsequently affirmed as a
constitutional right by the English Bill of Rights following the Glorious
Revolution of 1688.122 Unlike political rights—such as voting—which were
reserved to certain classes, the right to petition was a civil right which was
extended to all.123 Thus, through the petition process, the attention of
113 See id. at 2168 (describing the quasi-judicial nature of petitions, including those seeking
private redress).
114 See id. (noting that public and private petitions “took the same form” and “were treated in
a similar fashion”).
115 See id. at 2165 n.31 (“[W]hen the King convened Parliament to obtain funds, Parliament
conditioned the provision of funds on the granting of petitions.”). Moreover, King Henry V agreed
in 1414 to refrain from enacting legislative responses to petitions contrary to Parliament’s wishes. Id.
116 See id. at 2165, n.31 (“Thus the King was usually, though not always, left to devise methods
to implement the requested redress.”).
117 See id. at 2167-68 (“Parliament thus had an interest in considering all petitions because any given
grievance could ground an attempt to increase Parliament’s power at the expense of royal authority.”)
118 See supra note 110.
119 See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
120 See Mark, supra note 16, at 2169-70 (listing several groups that engaged in petitioning during this
period and noting that “an extremely wide band of English society participated in politics by petitioning
for redress of grievances, without question a wider spectrum of society than that with the franchise”).
121 See 5 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND app. ccxiii (1809) (Proclamation of July 10,
1624) (granting “the Right of his Subjects to make their immediate Addresses to him by petition”).
122 See Smith, supra note 16, at 1160 (noting that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 led to “the
Bill or Rights that fully confirmed the right of petition as an element of the British constitution”);
BILL OF RIGHTS of 1689, para. 23 (Eng.) (“That it is the right of the subjects to petition the king,
and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal . . . .”)
123 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1182 (noting the distinction between political and civil rights
and observing that in nineteenth-century America, political rights included “the rights to votes, to hold
public office, and to serve on juries,” while civil rights included “a broad range of rights and freedoms,
including the freedom of speech, freedom to worship, the right to contract, the right to hold property,
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Parliament and the Crown could be captured, at least momentarily, by nearly
any subject of England, regardless of wealth or political power.
The story of the right to petition in England offers insights into
contemporary efforts to allocate government access. Initially, the right was
abstract and unenforceable, accompanied by neither a way to oblige the King
nor a clear system for how access would be granted or obtained.124 From there,
an informal and money-driven system of influence emerged, one that
disproportionately favored elites (the parallels to our current lobbying system
should be apparent by now).125 Over time, however, as formal channels and
institutions were established to support the petitioning process, the right to
petition grew more egalitarian, resulting in a quasi-procedural right of access
accompanied by guarantees of consideration and response.126
It was this version of petitioning that crossed the Atlantic and took root
in America. Colonial charters secured the right to colonists127 and colonists
regularly petitioned colonial assemblies,128 which in turn received and
referred these petitions to committees on equal footing.129 More importantly,
the colonies—themselves an unenfranchised minority unrepresented in
Parliament—depended on petitioning as a means of securing access to the
Crown.130 To understand the importance the colonists placed on the right to
and the right to sue and be sued”); Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the
Reconstruction Amendments, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1207, 1208-10 (1992) (noting the same distinction).
124 See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
125 See supra Section I.A.
126 See supra notes 108–123 and accompanying text.
127 See Mark, supra note 16, at 2174 (“[English colonists] understood petitioning as the
foundation of politics and of individual and collective participation in politics, warranting the highest
degree of protection.”); Don L. Smith, The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances:
Constitutional Development and Interpretation 46 (August 1971) (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech
University), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.899.7179&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/7Z9H-DZSV] (“[C]ontent analysis of the colonial charters shows that petition
appears, either specifically or as one of the ‘ancient liberties’ of Englishmen, in over fifty provisions.”).
128 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 102, at 105-07 (noting the prevalence of petitioning and
their central role in the lawmaking process); Mark, supra note 16, at 2176-78 (noting that “many of
the colonial assemblies explicitly affirmed the colonists’ right to petition” and citing examples of
contemporary exercise of the right); Higginson, supra note 16, at 145 n.10 (noting the prevalence of
colonial petitioning and observing that “between 1750 and 1800 the [Virginia] legislature received
on average over 200 petitions per session”).
129 See RAYMOND C. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 32-34 (1979) (noting that from 1700-1800 the membership
on the Virginia Committee of Propositions and Grievances increased dramatically from ten
members to 173, constituting nearly every member of the legislature); MARY PATTERSON CLARKE,
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 210 (1943) (“All assemblies expected
petitions, and many resorted to the committee as a method of dealing with them.”).
130 See Smith, supra note 127, at 57-68 (noting repeated petitions from colonial government to
Parliament in response to, among others, the Sugar Act of 1764, the proposed Stamp Act of 1765,
the Townshend Acts of 1767, and the Intolerable Acts of 1774, the last of which would eventually lead
to the first Continental Congress).
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petition, one need look no further than the Declaration of Independence,
which concludes its list of grievances by noting that “[i]n every stage of these
Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our
repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury.”131 Indeed,
prior to the Declaration, the Continental Congress twice petitioned King
George III and was twice ignored.132 The colonists’ outrage reflects both the
importance of petitioning during this period and the contemporary
understanding that the right did not merely protect a particular form of
political expression but also included an expectation of consideration and
response—i.e., access.133
Following independence, the right to petition persisted. While the Articles
of Confederation mention the right only with respect to states,134 the individual
right was expressly protected by a majority of state constitutions135 and was
included among the amendments proposed by James Madison in 1789 that
ultimately became the Bill of Rights.136 The right to petition produced relatively
little debate during discussions in Congress over the First Amendment, so
entrenched was it by that point that its inclusion as a component of the new
representative structure would have been obvious and non-controversial.137
Two elements stand out from the historical record, however, and provide
some insight into the right’s intended scope and function. The first was the
decision to protect the right to petition the entire government, as opposed to

The Declaration of Independence para. 4 (U.S. 1776).
See 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 115–22 (Oct. 25, 1774)
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904) (petition to King); id. at 63–72 (Oct. 14, 1774) (resolution
protesting Parliament’s interference with right of petition); 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 158-62 (July 8, 1775) (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1905) (petition to
King). The first of these petitions was “neglected” by Parliament, while the second, the “Olive
Branch Petition,” was formally refused by the King. See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE:
MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 23–25 (1997).
133 See Higginson, supra note 16, at 155–56.
134 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, paras. 2-3.
135 See Smith, supra note 127, at 67-68 (locating an explicit right to petition in the original state
constitutions of North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Maryland, New Jersey, Georgia, as well as the protection of the right by Virginia, Rhode Island, and
Connecticut, noting that only Delaware, New York, and South Carolina “failed to make provision
for the protection of petition”).
136 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 440–68 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
137 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 102, at 109 (noting that the right to petition “would have been
viewed at the time as self-evident, a total non-issue”); Richard R. John & Christopher J. Young, Rites of
Passage, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S: PETITIONING, LOBBYING, AND INSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 103 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2002) [hereinafter HOUSE &
SENATE] (“In the Federalist era, the right to petition was relatively non-controversial—enjoying, as it
did, an honored place in English constitutional law.”); McKinley, supra note 9, at 1147 (2016) (“Given the
ubiquity of the practice in eighteenth-century America, it was taken for granted that the U.S.
Constitution would include the right to petition in its later-added Bill of Rights.”).
131
132
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merely the legislature.138 This choice reflected British and colonial practice
and also provided a means of petitioning government officials not otherwise
accountable to citizens via the electoral process.139 The second was Congress’
rejection of a right to instruction, which would have bound representatives to
the will of the electorate.140 While this rejection was likely motivated in part
by practical considerations and the desire for legislative independence,141 its
effect was to distinguish the right to petition from the electoral process: while
electoral majorities would determine representation, all petitioners had a
right to reception and consideration of their petitions, regardless of political
power or majority status.142
During the early years of the Republic, the right to petition was
considered highly important,143 and from the beginning petitioning operated
to allocate lawmaker attention and drive the legislative agenda. Even before
the passage of the First Amendment, Congress received hundreds of
petitions,144 and by 1795 the number of petitions had swelled such that one
contemporary newspaper remarked that “[t]he principal part of [Congress’s]
time has been taken up in reading and referring petitions.”145 These petitions
went far beyond private grievances and addressed matters including
commerce,146 public credit,147 the organization of the federal government,148
and the institution of slavery.149 Each was formally received by Congress and
138 See Spanbauer, supra note 13, at 40 (“The most significant change to the amendment for the
right to petition was the substitution of the word ‘government’ for the word ‘legislature.’”).
139 See id. (discussing “a broad vision of petitioning”).
140 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1154-56 (1991)
(noting the First Amendment’s rejection of a right to instruction and distinguishing instruction
from petitioning).
141 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1152 (noting that a right to instruction would “disrupt[] the
deliberative and independent lawmaking process envisioned by Article I.”).
142 See id. at 1193 (“The history of petitioning and the specific text of the Petition Clause
counsel against conflation of the electoral and the legislative processes.”).
143 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 25 (1994) (“First and foremost was the right to vote . . . . Next in
importance . . . was the right to petition . . . .”).
144 See William C. diGiacomantonio, Petitioners and Their Grievances: A View from the First
Federal Congress, in HOUSE & SENATE, supra note 137, at 31 (noting that the first Congress received
“more than six hundred petitions”).
145 See David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance of the Right of
Petition, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 113, 117 (1991).
146 See diGiacomantonio, supra note 144, at 31 (noting various petitions submitted to Congress
regarding trade policy, including the very first petition, which was submitted by the “tradesmen,
manufacturers, and others of Baltimore”).
147 See id. at 35 (noting several petitions concerned with Congress’s management of the national debt).
148 See id. at 44-46 (describing petitions regarding the location of the federal capital and the
federal courts, the management of the post office, and an investigation into the actions of a sitting
member of Congress).
149 See id. at 36-38 (noting several abolitionist petitions submitted to the first Congress).
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then referred to particular committees or to the executive branch.150 As in
England and the colonial assemblies, the first Congress heard and considered
petitions from all, including unenfranchised groups such as women, Blacks,
and Native Americans.151
The right to petition was not just formally egalitarian; it was practically
so. The only requirement to be heard was the cost of drafting and filing a
petition, and while there were certain formal requirements not unlike court
filings,152 and lawyers were occasionally hired to assist with drafting and
filing,153 these minor obstacles likely did not exclude would-be petitioners
from exercising their rights.154 For decades, it was standard procedure for
petitions to be formally presented to Congress and then referred to an
appropriate committee155 or to an appropriate executive agency.156 This
process continued well into the 1830s and 1840s, whereupon a Congress
divided upon the issue of slavery passed a series of resolutions limiting

150 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COM., 99TH CONG., PETITIONS, MEMORIAL AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 7, 1789 TO
DECEMBER 14, 1795, at 361-362 (Comm. Print 1986) (listing various committees and executive offices to
which petitioners were referred).
151 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1152-53 (noting that women and Native Americans were
among the petitioners heard by the first Congress); Mark, supra note 16, at 2182 (describing various
unenfranchised groups, including men, women, Blacks and Native Americans, who made use of the
petition process).
152 See, e.g., Mark, supra note 16, at 2171 (describing the formal requirements of seventeenth
century petitions, including address specifications).
153 See Jeffrey L. Pasley, Private Access and Public Power: Gentility and Lobbying in the Early
Congress, in HOUSE & SENATE, supra note 137, at 62 (providing examples of attorneys hired to assist
with various petitions).
154 It is worth noting that it would have been easy for lawmakers to make petitioning more
difficult and thus exclude certain groups from participating. See Mark, supra note 16, at 2220 (noting
a nineteenth century requirement that conditioned Congress’ consideration of petitions on them
being “signed only or primarily by those legitimately allowed to request a redress of grievances,” a
requirement whose practical effect was to “delimit the sphere of individuals” who could participate,
including free Blacks, women, and other marginalized groups during the “gag-rule” period of
congressional backlash to a wave of anti-slavery petitions). The general trend, however, has been
towards fewer requirements. Id. at 2228 (describing how petitions grew less formal during the
twentieth century).
155 See Frederick, supra note 145, at 118 (“[T]he normal practice in the decades between the
ratification of the first amendment and the debates of the 1830s was for Congress to receive petitions
and refer them to committees.”); John P. Nields, Right of Petition, in LECTURES ON HISTORY AND
GOVERNMENT: SERIES ONE 1923-1924, at 135 (Univ. of Del. Dep’ts of Hist. & Pol. Sci. 1924)
(“[D]own to 1834 the custom or procedure in Congress was to receive, hear and then refer petitions
to appropriate committees.”).
156 See RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE
PERIOD BEFORE 1825, at 135 (1917) (noting that “Congress seemed to feel that the head of a
department would answer [petitions] just as well as a committee” and providing examples of
petitions referred to cabinet members in the 1790s).
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consideration of petitions on the subject.157 While some point to these socalled “gag rules” as the end of the formal petition process,158 more recent
scholarship reveals that Congress continued to receive and respond to
petitions well into the twentieth century.159
The formal petition process addressed the challenge of allocating access
to lawmakers by extending the right to petition as broadly as possible and by
receiving and considering all petitions on equal footing. This practice
generated an enormous volume of petitions,160 and the petition process time
and again responded by establishing formal institutions such as committees
to manage the workload.161 As we will see, it was only when these institutions
were no longer able to support the needs of the government that formal
petitioning began to decline.162
B. Historical Petitioning as Information
While petitioning’s ubiquity and longevity may in part be explained by
its value to petitioners, petitioning also functioned as a primary means of
gathering information, highlighting important issues, and facilitating
effective governance. In the thirteenth century, King Edward I embraced
petitions as a means of exercising greater authority over local affairs,163 and

157 See CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1840) (noting the House of Representatives
statement that it would no longer receive petitions or resolutions “praying the abolition of slavery”);
Higginson, supra note 16, at 158-162 (describing Congress’s response to aggressive abolitionist
petitioning and the passage of the “gag rules”).
158 See Higginson, supra note 16, at 165 (ascribing the “abrupt defeat” of petitioning to its
“misfortune [of becoming] inextricably entangled in the slavery crisis”); Gary Lawson & Guy
Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 739, 751 (1999) (“The so-called gag
rule . . . brought this era of petitioning to an end.”).
159 See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American Democracy, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 32-35 (2011) (noting the gag rule’s overstated impact); John & Young, supra note 137,
at 137-38 (noting that from the 1830s to the 1910s, “the papers of the House and Senate contain hundreds
of thousands of petitions on an extraordinary range of topics”); Benjamin Schneer, Representation
Replaced: How Congressional Petitions Substitute for Direct Elections 18 (Sept. 12, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (analyzing data on petitioning rates from 1881–1949).
160 See, e.g., Mark, supra note 16, at 2214-15 (noting several accounts of the massive number of
petitions filed in colonial assemblies while also noting that these figures have perhaps been
overstated by historians).
161 See id. at 2214 (noting that solutions to increased petitioning “replicate themselves from
body to body, from medieval Parliament through late eighteenth-century colonial assemblies” and
noting committees in particular).
162 See infra Section II.C.
163 See GWILYM DODD, JUSTICE AND GRACE: PRIVATE PETITIONING AND THE ENGLISH
PARLIAMENT IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 32 (2007) (noting that Edward I is likely to have viewed
petitioning “in positive terms, as an opportunity to promote royal interests and significantly increase
his own personal authority”).
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under his reign Parliament began to convene regularly to hear them.164 By
providing redress to local grievances, the Crown could keep tabs on its
servants, increase its legitimacy, and govern effectively at a local level.165 The
Crown’s interest in local information is evident not only from its ongoing
acceptance of petitions but also from its direct solicitation of information on
local matters.166 As Gwilym Dodd observes, “It was not enough for a
petitioner simply to state that he had a grievance to be resolved; he had to
provide enough detail to make it incumbent upon the Crown to pursue the
case and reach a judgement [sic].”167 To this effect, petitions during this period
often contained specific details as to persons, times, dates, geographical
details, land transactions, legal claims, and judicial proceedings.168
Over time, the informational dimension of petitioning became a major
justification for treating petitioning as a civil right, rather than a mere
practice.169 The 1688 Trial of the Seven Bishops—a case that was itself a
precursor to the Glorious Revolution and the inclusion of the right to petition
in the English Bill of Rights—is instructive on this point. King James II, the
Catholic head of the Protestant Church of England, issued a Declaration of
Indulgence suspending religious penal laws and ordered the clergy to read
the Declaration from the pulpit.170 This order was widely protested,171 and the
Archbishop of Canterbury, along with six other bishops, submitted a petition
164 See id. at 22-23 (noting that under Edward I, Parliament “fitted into a set pattern of regular
meetings” to handle the “constant stream” of petitions from localities). Under King Henry III, these
meetings had been carried out on an ad-hoc basis, usually prompted by the need for taxation or
information. Id. (noting that these meetings “were determined by the crown’s occasional need for taxation
and/or its intermittent desire to consult the political community on important matters of policy” (citing
R. F. TREHARNE, SIMON DE MONTFORT AND BARONIAL REFORM: THIRTEENTH-CENTURY
ESSAYS 209 (E.B. Fryde ed., 1986)). Notably, the first recorded gathering of elected knights by Henry
III at Oxford in 1227 was called to gather information on local sheriffs. See LYON, supra note 90, at 416
(“The main purpose of the meeting seems to have been to secure information.”).
165 See DODD, supra note 163, at 33 (“[B]y introducing a legal channel by which men (or
women) of lesser status could seek redress . . . Edward not only made local government more
accountable, but in doing so significantly increased the power and control that the Crown wielded
over its servants.”).
166 See id. at 32-33 (citing instances of Edward I soliciting information on local officials’
misdeeds); id. at 295 (noting instances from later reigns of the Crown responding to petitions with
requests for more information).
167 Id. at 295.
168 See id. at 296.
169 See David Zaret, Petitions and the “Invention” of Public Opinion in the English Revolution, 101
AM. J. SOC. 1497, 1515 (1996) (noting that the right to petition was regularly defended in the
seventeenth century as “freedom of information,” as a means of “[c]onveying information,” and as
providing for the government’s “better information,” while criticizing those who would refuse to
hear petitions as “scorn[ing] information” (internal quotes omitted)).
170 See His Majesty’s Gracious Declaration to All His Loving Subjects for Liberty of
Conscience (given at Court of Whitehall April 1687 and May 1688), reprinted in 12 Howell St. Tr.
234, 234-39 (1812).
171 See Schnapper, supra note 16, at 313 (“That directive was widely disobeyed . . . .”).
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explaining why they felt the King’s order was unlawful and requesting that
they be excused from it.172 The bishops were arrested and charged with
seditious libel for their petition.173
It is noteworthy that at this time in England there was no general right to
freedom of speech.174 The Bishops’ counsel therefore rested its defense on the
distinct right to petition.175 They raised two rationales for why petitions ought
to be afforded greater protection. First, they argued that petitioning was the
primary, if not sole, means by which aggrieved citizens might seek redress—a
matter of access.176 Second, they argued that petitions were a fundamental
source of information to facilitate policymaking and prevent the Crown from
taking wrongful action. In their petition to King James II, for example, the
Bishops had provided information about a 1558 statute177 that they claimed
made the King’s Declaration unlawful.178 The Bishops’ counsel cautioned that
infringing upon the right to petition threatened the free flow of information to
the Crown, asking Parliament to “suppose that there might be a king of
England that should be misled . . . should be environed with counselors that
had given him evil advice . . . [and] would not permit . . . the great men of the
kingdom to offer the king their advice . . . .”179 In such a situation, the bishops’
counsel argued, it was the duty of the Bishops to provide correcting information
to prevent the King from taking wrongful action.180 The Bishops were
ultimately acquitted,181 and King James II’s attempt to infringe upon the right
to petition led both to the right being enshrined in the 1689 bill of rights182 and
See The Trial of the Seven Bishops for Publishing a Libel, 12 Howell St. Tr. at 420-28.
Id. at 369-70.
See Schnapper, supra note 16, at 318 (“In the late seventeenth century, although the existence
of a right to petition was widely accepted and understood, there was no comparable recognition of
any general right of freedom of speech.”).
175 12 Howell St. Tr. at 369-70 (arguing that it was “the right of all people that apprehend
themselves aggrieved, to approach his majesty by petition”).
176 See id. at 393-94 (arguing that without the right to petition, “men must have grievances
upon them, and yet they not to be admitted to seek relief ”).
177 See An Act for the Uniformity of Common Prayer and Service in the Church, and
Administration of the Sacraments, 1 Eliz. 1 ch. 2 § 15 (1558), reprinted in 6 Statutes at Large 117, 120 (Danby
Pickering ed., 1763) (requiring the clergy to “endeavour themselves to the uttermost of their knowledges,
that the due and true execution [of the Act] may be had throughout their diocese and charges”).
178 12 Howell St. Tr at 364 (noting that the 1558 Act made the bishops “special guardians” and that
James II’s Declaration commanded them to “do an act relating to their ecclesiastical function . . . and how
could they in conscience do it, when they thought part of the declaration was not according to law?”)
179 Id. at 368-69
180 Id. at 365 (arguing that the Bishops had “done nothing but [their] duty”); id. at 369 (asking,
if the Bishops “humbly apply themselves to the king, and offer him their advice, where is the
crime?”); id. at 371 (“For I never thought it, nor hath it ever, sure, been thought by any body else, to
be a crime to petition the king: for the king may be mistaken . . . .”).
181 Id. at 430.
182 See Schnapper, supra note 16, at 313 (noting that the drafters of the 1689 Bill of Rights were wellacquainted with the trial, as five of the drafters had themselves served as defense counsel for the bishops.)
172
173
174
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James II’s deposition.183 In acquitting the Bishops, Parliament recognized the
role that the right to petition played in preventing the government from
making decisions based on limited information or information skewed by a
small circle of counsellors.184 These institutional concerns, prominent in
seventeenth-century England, remain pressing today.185
While Parliament relied on petitions to complement its own knowledge
and expertise, for legislatures in colonial America, petitions played an even
more essential role as a primary source of information for lawmakers. In
contrast to members of Parliament, colonial representatives in the early
eighteenth century were mostly volunteer farmers untrained in law or policy
who had neither the time nor the expertise to gather information on
important issues or to develop policies.186 Because they lacked sources of
knowledge or examples of well-crafted laws from which to work,187 early
assemblies often produced poorly worded and unworkable legislation.188 Over
time, however, petitioning became a valuable source of information,189 and as
the number of petitions increased,190 they began to drive the legislative
agenda.191 By incorporating information provided in petitions, colonial
legislatures gauged constituent opinion and facilitated legislation covering a

183 Id. at 313-14 (noting that the case was “a major step towards the Glorious Revolution and
the deposing of James II”).
184 See Schnapper, supra note 16, at 344 (describing Parliament’s recognition of the
“institutional problem” presented by the restriction of information provided by petitions).
185 See id. (noting the dangers that might have arisen if libel actions could have been brought
by “racist southern officials” against those complaining of racial discrimination, or if a nominee for
federal office could have brought a similar action against statements made in testimony during
Senate confirmation hearings).
186 See Higginson, supra note 16, at 153 (“Few representatives were trained as legislators; most
were farmers, holding short terms of office and busy with private responsibilities. They had neither
time nor expertise to discover independently the colony’s woes or to determine solutions.”).
187 See Alison G. Olson, Eighteenth-Century Colonial Legislatures and Their Constituents, 79 J. AM. HIST.
543, 549 (“There were few trained lawyers in early colonial society, and hence in the legislatures,
assemblymen had few precedents to guide them . . . [or] sources of information outside the capital cities.”).
188 See id. (“Accordingly, they bungled issues by writing impractical or incomprehensible laws. Towns
were legislated into existence at inappropriate sites; wages were regulated in areas where laborers easily
moved out onto available farmland; the price of bread was assigned on sizes the bakers did not sell.”).
189 See id. at 556-58 (noting the increasing role played by petitions and the information
provided); Higginson, supra note 16, at 153 (“In communities that lacked developed media or party
structures and that provided limited suffrage, petitioning supplied vital information to assemblies.”).
190 See BAILEY, supra note 80, at 62 tbl.5; Olson, supra note 187, at 556-58
191 See Olson, supra note 187, at 556 (estimating that approximately half of all laws passed by
colonial assemblies during the eighteenth century originated as petitions); BAILEY, supra note 80, at
64; THOMAS L. PURVIS, PROPRIETORS, PATRONAGE, AND PAPER MONEY: LEGISLATIVE
POLITICS IN NEW JERSEY, 1703–1776, at 178 tbl.7.1 (1986); ALAN TULLY, WILLIAM PENN’S LEGACY:
POLITICS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PROVINCIAL PENNSYLVANIA, 1726-1755, at 99 (1977).
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wide range of issues.192 Petitioning also played a significant role in shining a
light on corruption and official misconduct.193
Petitions continued to be a source of vital information at the first Congress,
providing significant levels of detail, and included supporting documents, maps,
and other data.194 Importantly, the egalitarian nature of petitioning directly
impacted the information that was available to lawmakers at the Founding.
Because the right to petition extended further than the right to vote, petitions
included information from disenfranchised and unrepresented groups such as
women, Native Americans, prisoners, and enslaved persons.195 Likewise,
without information in petitions, Congress and colonial legislatures would have
been unaware of and thus unable to address the needs of poor localities or
marginalized groups such as orphans, debtors, and the mentally ill.196 The fact
that petitions were considered irrespective of their source meant that the
information available to legislators—both the issues raised and perspectives on
those issues—was also inclusive, reflecting the views of the politically powerful
and the unenfranchised alike. Thus, the allocation of government access and the
information available to lawmakers are linked. Parliament, colonial assemblies,
and the early Congress provided a near-universal right to petition and
considered all petitions on equal footing. In exchange, petitions provided these
governments with broad and inclusive information.

192 See Higginson, supra note 16, at 154 (“Information from petitions also led to foundings of
new towns and counties, settlements of boundary disputes and efforts at internal improvements.”
(footnotes omitted)).
193 See id. (“Maladministration or corruption among public agents, excessive taxation,
injustices perpetrated by courts and misconduct by local officials . . . were brought to public
attention by petitioners’ ire.”).
194 See diGiacomantonio, supra note 144, at 46 (noting the use of additional information in
petitions). One illustrative example was a petitioning campaign led by Abolitionist Quakers that
submitting so many petitions that a full House committee was created specifically to receive them.
See William C. diGiacomantonio, “For the Gratification of a Volunteering Society”: Antislavery and
Pressure Group Politics in the First Federal Congress, 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 169, 179 (1995) (“[M]ore is
known about the House committee on the Quaker petitions than about any other committee in the
First Congress.”). This committee requested “all the [i]nformation they [could] obtain,” and the
Quakers in response provided a “small library of antislavery literature.” Id. at 179-80 (quoting Letter
from John Pemberton to James Pemberton, Feb. 15, 1790, Pennsylvania Abolition Society
Collection). Id. at 180 n.17 (detailing the many volumes delivered to the House committee). Quaker
petitioners also crafted and presented their arguments directly to the committee through oral
testimony, supplemental documents, and feedback on an unpublished draft of the committee’s
report. See id. at 181; Pasley, supra note 153, at 64-65.
195 See Higginson, supra note 16, at 153 (“[U]nrepresented groups—notably woman, felons,
Indians, and in some cases, slaves—represented themselves and voiced grievances through petitions.”).
196 See id. at 153 (“Public funds to reimburse those who cared for orphans, the sick, or the
insane, assistance to towns in times of hardship, and protection of debtors all depended upon the
continual flow of petitions from individuals and towns.” (citation omitted)).
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C. Petitioning’s Decline and the Rise of Lobbying
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the formal processes and
institutions that were characteristic of petitioning gradually eroded,
providing an opening for the rise of our modern system of lobbying. 197 But
where the old system allocated access on equal footing, the new system picked
as its winners those with wealth or political power.198 Similarly, while
petitioning provided lawmakers with information that was broad and
inclusive of all voices, the information provided by lobbyists
disproportionately reflected powerful interests.199 The most significant
change, however, was the failure of those institutions within Congress that
had facilitated petitioning by receiving, referring, and resolving petitions to
scale alongside the expansion of the federal government.200 Without these
formal mechanisms for allocating lawmaker access, our modern pay-for-play
system of informal lobbying emerged to fill the void.
This Section tracks the decline of formal petition and the rise of lobbying
through the lens of access and information and highlights both the post-Civil
War expansion of the federal government and the inability of antebellum
institutions to scale accordingly.201 This expansion of government facilitated
lobbying’s rise in two ways: first, an increase in the sheer volume of
government business created allocative pressures which antebellum
institutions couldn’t accommodate; second, the complexities of a growing
nation and economy increased the informational needs of lawmakers who
came to rely on well-resourced and expert lobbyists.
One reason why petitioning was so effective at allocating government
access was that, prior to the Civil War, the government’s workload was
relatively light and there were fewer demands on lawmaker attention.202 After
197 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1156 (noting that “[t]he rise of our modern, ubiquitous lobbying
culture did not occur until the mid- to late-nineteenth century” and that lobbying only fully
supplanted petitioning “likely some time during the Progressive Era”); Schneer, supra note 159, at 1314 fig.1 (tracking the gradual decline of petitioning during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
198 See, e.g., Pasley, supra note 153, at 61 (“Since only the wealthiest institutions and individuals could
afford such extra representation, the polity seemed to be losing some of its democratic character.”).
199 See, e.g., David J. Rothman, Politics and Power: The United States Senate 1869-1901, at 20204 (1966).
200 See infra notes 204–211 and accompanying text.
201 Several scholars have identified this period as one in which the petition process began to
decline. See, e.g., Pasley, supra note 153, at 60. Other scholars, however, note how petitioning persisted
in a diminished form well into the twentieth century and how petitioning was incorporated into the
emerging administrative state. See, e.g., El-Haj, supra note 159, at 32-35 (noting the persistence of
petitioning into the twentieth century); John & Young, supra note 137, at 137-38 (same); McKinley,
supra note 9, at 1201 n.465 (highlighting how the emergence of the administrative state might factor
into the historical analysis).
202 See Pasley, supra note 153, at 60 (“[T]he congressional workload was small enough in the
1790s that a mere paper petition often really was enough to get the government’s attention.”).
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the Founding, members of Congress had attention to spare, and could thus
devote meaningful consideration to all manner of petitions, even those from
individual citizens.203 The workload of Congress following the Civil War,
however, was vastly different from that of the First Congress; while Congress
considered just 147 bills in the 1790s, by the turn of the century it faced more
than 28,000.204 This increase can be attributed to several factors. First, the
country was growing both in population and landmass, and Congress’ routine
responsibilities scaled accordingly.205 Second, the rise of new technologies
and industries, including railroads, demanded federal entry into areas
previously handled by state and local governments due to their complexity
and increasingly interstate nature.206 Third, during this time Congress turned
its attention to social issues such as education, labor, Native rights, and the
interests of freedmen, which further expanded its workload.207
The expansion of the federal government meant not only that Congress
had more to do, but also that more of it was likely to affect the everyday lives
of constituents who, in turn, sought greater access.208 As a result, members of
Congress began to face unprecedented demands on their time and
attention.209 The mechanisms of the formal petition process designed to
allocate access, however, failed to scale with the increased scope of

203 Id. (“A brief glance through the records shows that Congress was willing to give serious
consideration to all manner of petitioners, be they major business leaders or obscure citizens . . . .”).
204 See Margaret Susan Thompson, Corruption—or Confusion? Lobbying and Congressional
Government in the Early Gilded Age, 10 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 169, 172-73, 173 tbl.1 (1983) (noting
the various phenomena that led to the increase in Congressional activity).
205 See id. at 173 (noting that increases in population and the addition of new territories and
states “led to skyrocketing demands for routine services: post offices; law enforcement and judicial
personnel; revenue, land, pension, and customs agents; internal improvements; and so on”).
206 See id. at 174 (noting that “Washington had no choice” but to assume oversight of the
railroad industry given its size and impact).
207 See id. at 174-75 (noting that the Civil War and Reconstruction expanded the “boundaries
of acceptable public action” and inspired a “popular enthusiasm for public solutions to what formerly
had been considered private problems,” leading to the creation of the Freedman’s Bureau and the
Education Department).
208 See MARGARET SUSAN THOMPSON, THE “SPIDER WEB”: CONGRESS AND LOBBYING
IN THE AGE OF GRANT 128 (1985) (noting that during the Gilded Age people “felt the effects of
government more acutely than in the past and consequently cared about and watched its operation
more closely” and that members of Congress were “deluged with constituent demands” in the form
of letters, petitions, and direct access).
209 See id. (noting that pressures facing members of Congress in the Gilded Age “were more
numerous and probably more intense than those that confronted earlier generations of House
members”); id. at 130 (“All in all, hundreds of messages would inundate each man in the Capitol. . . .
[A]ll would be competing for shares of the finite resources of time, energy, and clout and the
individual legislator’s command.”).
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government,210 prompting the aggrieved to seek other means of obtaining
access—namely, lobbyists.211
It has often been claimed that lobbying is “probably as old as
government.”212 As Jeffrey Pasley notes, however, formal petitions, like letterwriting and the publication of newspaper articles, are “not the kinds of
influence . . . that the political term lobbying was invented to describe.”213
Indeed, as he explains, if we set aside petitions for individual private claims
and confine our definition of lobbying to the practice as we know it today—
that is, efforts at influencing public policy by obtaining direct, personal access
to lawmakers—we find relatively few instances of “lobbying” at the time of
the First Congress.214 While some petitioners hired attorneys to assist them
in drafting petitions,215 this sort of agent-based petitioning was largely
confined to petitions for individual claims, rather than questions of public
policy.216 Likewise, while some early petitioners sought direct access to
lawmakers to advance their claims, there is little to suggest that petitioners
enjoyed the type of consistent personal access typical of lobbyists today217 or
that these efforts at personal access had significant influence on the
lawmaking process.218
Lobbying persisted, however, and by the time of the Civil War
professional lobbyists had been around for some time. Their profession,
however, was marked, then as now, by intense public disdain.219 As early as
1856, the poet Walt Whitman counted “lobbyers” [sic] alongside “bribers,
compromisers, . . . sponges, . . . policy backers, [and] monte-dealers” and
210 See Henry Brooks Adams, The Session, 111 N. AM. REV. 29, 59-60 (1870) (“[N]ew powers, new
duties, new responsibilities [and] new burdens of every sort, are incessantly crowding upon the government
at the very moment when it finds itself unequal to managing the limited powers it is accustomed to
wield. . . . The amount of business has become so enormous as to choke the channels provided for it.”).
211 See Thompson, supra note 204, at 180 (noting that “[t]raditional channels of communication,
especially those between legislators and their constituents, were clogged” and that “[i]n their
impatience, people began to look for ways of breaking through the logjam” and found in lobbyists
“a marked improvement in their chances for substantive satisfaction”).
212 Pasley, supra note 153, at 57 n.1 (quoting LESTER W. MILBRATH, THE WASHINGTON
LOBBYISTS 12 (1963)); see also id. (identifying various other authors making the same assertion).
213 Id. at 58-59, 65.
214 See id.
215 See id. at 62 (noting examples of attorneys hired to assist with petitions across a variety of topics).
216 Id.
217 See id. at 63-64 (noting that, despite some “temporary lobbyists” following Congress to seek support
for their petitions, “there is little evidence of extensive or meaningful contact with members of Congress”).
218 Id. at 65 (“[T]here is not enough evidence in the petition histories to conclude that much
of the government’s work or the general direction of public policy was being directed or even heavily
influenced by avowed lobbyists.”).
219 See Conor McGrath & Phil Harris, The Creation of the US Lobbying Industry, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL MANAGEMENT 407, 408 (Dennis W. Johnson ed., 2008) (describing
various nineteenth-century accounts of professional lobbyists); 2 ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE:
1789-1989, at 491, 497 (Wendy Wolff ed., 1991) (describing more negative contemporary accounts).
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described them as “crawling, serpentine men, the lousy combings and born
freedom sellers of the earth.”220 Even where lobbyists had been employed,
their efficacy was uncertain at best,221 and their methods questionable.222
With petitioning’s decline, however, aggrieved parties were left without an
effective means of obtaining access, and thus had little choice but to turn to
lobbyists, 223 whose costly services made them a viable option only for those
able and willing to pay.224
At the same time that Congress’s docket grew larger, it also grew more
varied and complex, requiring lawmakers to obtain ever more information to
deal with the issues before them. Members of Congress, however, lacked the
resources, staff, or expertise to obtain this information.225 The need for
information drove members of Congress to embrace lobbyists, who quickly
became indispensable experts on complex matters, just as it had driven the
English Crown to embrace petitioning centuries before.226 Indeed, it was
through the provision of information that lobbyists gained valuable influence
in Washington, with lawmakers seeking out lobbyists for facts to support their
positions and lobbyists offering such information at every opportunity. 227

220 WALT WHITMAN, THE EIGHTEENTH PRESIDENCY! 28–29 (Edward F. Grier, ed.)
(1856); see also Pasley, supra note 153, at 61.
221 See ROTHMAN, supra note 199, at 192 (noting that during the 1870s, lobbyists appeared
“careless and haphazard, neither especially benefitting nor endangering Senate proceedings”); id. at
198 (noting that the use of lobbyists was “no guarantee of satisfaction”); id. at 201 (“Despite significant
expenditures and efforts, from the most legitimate to the most questionable, business interests could
not efficiently prejudice the legislative process.”); BYRD, supra note 219, at 494 (describing how Tom
Scott, a railroad operator, employed two hundred lobbyists for the 1876-1877 Congressional session
but nevertheless was unable to win support for his railroad and noting how businessmen at the time
were “not always certain that a lobbyist possessed the influence he claimed”).
222 See ROTHMAN, supra note 199, at 196-202 (noting that, while “bribery was neither
permiss[i]ble nor desirable, there were other methods for bestowing favors on potential supporters”
and describing how lobbyists provided members of Congress with loans, railroad passes, inexpensive
stock, and jobs).
223 See Pasley, supra note 153, at 60-61 (noting that the post-Civil War expansion of government
made it impossible for lawmakers to devote individual attention to petitions and was a “major cause”
of the rise of lobbying during this period).
224 See, e.g., BYRD, supra note 219, at 499 (describing how obtaining access was practically
impossible except for those who could afford lobbyists); THOMPSON, supra note 208, at 165-73 (same).
225 See BYRD, supra note 219, at 497 (“Turnover of membership was high; levels of
parliamentary expertise were correspondingly low. Neither house had formal floor leadership. There
was practically no staff, either for committees or for individual members.”); THOMPSON, supra note
208, at 33-69 (making the same assertion).
226 See ROTHMAN, supra note 199, at 203 (noting that during the 1890s, lobbyists provided members
of Congress with “information that only representatives of particular organizations could gather” and
helped them “understand the increasingly technical legislation that came before the chamber”).
227 See id. at 203-04 (noting that Senators would often seek out pressure groups to bolster their
arguments and describing a case in which Wyoming Senator Francis Warren solicited information
on a wool tariff from lobbyists).
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Over time, members of Congress came to trust that if there was information
they needed a friendly lobbyist would be there to provide it.228
Formal petitioning was not eliminated by the rise of lobbying, but it did
undergo fundamental changes. While in the Founding era petitions had
sought specific forms of redress and might be accompanied by detailed
information, post-Civil War petitions were often deliberately short—often
omitting essential details or information for lawmakers, or even a specific
request for relief.229 Instead, these petitions were tools of mass politics
intended to focus attention on particular issues and to apply political
pressure—the “sound bites” of the time.230 By the early twentieth century,
petitions could no longer be relied upon to secure the attention of
lawmakers,231 and they no longer provided useful information to lawmakers,
who had come to rely on lobbyists for expertise and public opinion polls to
learn their constituents’ preferences.232 The role of petitioning has since
declined to the point where by the 1980s the House no longer had any formal
mechanism for receiving or considering petitions.233
The history of formal petitioning demonstrates that the right to petition
protects more than a form of political expression. Rather, it protects a
particular mechanism of representative government and the right of all
members of society to meaningfully participate in the lawmaking process and
to be heard by their government. Petitioning made use of formal institutions
to allocate the public’s access to lawmakers and to provide needed information
to lawmakers. These interests—access and information—drove the
228 See id. at 205-06 (noting that “Senators expected lobbyists to supply the necessary facts”
and that “Senators and lobbyists customarily joined together for their mutual benefit.”); Thompson,
supra note 204, at 171 (noting that during the 1870s, lobbyists “could be relied upon to be informed
thoroughly about the issues in the cases they accepted” and that lawmakers “could count on the
substantive accuracy of what they were told”).
229 Mark, supra note 16, at 2226-27.
230 See id. at 2160-61 (describing petitions during this time as “a tool of democratic mass
politics, useful in creating political dramas and highlighting legislative deadlocks”); id. at 2226
(noting that post-Civil War petitions “were not instruments of deliberation or persuasion in
themselves, but rather instruments of mass politics”).
231 See, e.g., Pasley, supra note 153, at 60-61 (observing that, while during the 1790s “a mere
paper petition often really was enough to get the government’s attention . . . [but t]his kind of
individual attention to petitions became less possible with the expansion of the government during
the Civil War”); LEON WHIPPLE, OUR ANCIENT LIBERTIES 106 (1927) (noting that petitions to
Congress “have proved of no great value in securing legislative action, even when the signers reached
into the millions as in the case of certain petitions for woman’s suffrage”); Thompson, supra note
204, at 180 (noting that as a result of the expansion of the government, “many who tried to deal with
Washington became frustrated by the lack of responsiveness they found there”).
232 See John & Young, supra note 137, at 138 (noting that public opinion polls provided “more
systematic techniques for registering public sentiment”).
233 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COM., supra note 150, at 9 (“The importance of
petitioning in the federal legislative process has diminished to the extent that presently no
mechanism exists for the presentation and consideration of petitions on the floor of the House.”).
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development of the right to petition and help to distinguish it from the right
to free speech. Moving forward, courts and Congress should take these
interests seriously in crafting a distinct Petition Clause doctrine and new
mechanisms for public engagement.
III. THE PETITION CLAUSE DOCTRINE
This Part excavates the Supreme Court’s Petition Clause doctrine to
illustrate the role that access and information interests have played in the
Court’s jurisprudence and to highlight where historical context may serve to
further inform and develop the doctrine. Despite petitioning’s long history
and its central role in the lawmaking process for much of American history,
the First Amendment right to petition did not receive serious attention from
the Supreme Court until the 1950s.234 By this time, of course, informal
lobbying had more or less displaced petitioning as the primary means of
engaging with lawmakers,235 and it was against this background of informal
access that these cases were decided.236 Scholars have observed that the
Court’s early Petition Clause Doctrine does not incorporate petitioning’s
historical context, and instead relies on textualism.237 As a result, the Court
has struggled to distinguish petitions from other forms of political speech and
eventually conflated the two.238
Even amidst this conflation, however, there remains hope for the right to
petition. First, the Supreme Court signaled in its most recent Petition Clause case,
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, its willingness to consider the history of petitioning
and to disaggregate the Speech and Petition clauses.239 Second, even without
historical context, a close reading of the Court’s Petition Clause doctrine reveals
234 See generally United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961); see also McKinley, supra note 9, at 1163-65
(describing Harriss as “the Court’s first opportunity for substantive analysis of the right to petition”
and Noerr as “the first case to address the right to petition in any depth”).
235 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1156 (noting that lobbying likely overtook petitioning
sometime during the Progressive Era); Schneer, supra note 159, at 16-17 (noting petitioning’s decline
during the early twentieth century and attributing this in part to the rise of lobbying).
236 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1139 (arguing that the Court’s Petition Clause doctrine
assumes that “lobbying and petitioning are coextensive” in part due to its being crafted “against a
background of changed circumstances” and a lack of historical context).
237 Id. at 1163 (noting that Justice Black, in crafting the Noerr decision and other “pillars of our
Petition Clause doctrine,” applied a textualist approach, rather than one grounded in history); see
also We the People Found., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140, 149 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J.,
concurring) (noting that “[i]t remains to be seen” how the Court would respond to historical
evidence of petitioning, and that it would “[n]o doubt . . . present an interesting question”).
238 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1164 (“In the absence of [historical] context, the Court has
struggled to provide clear and fixed meanings to the Petition clause, often conflating practices
historically distinct but termed similarly in modern parlance.”).
239 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 279 (2011).
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that the Court’s reasoning has consistently been informed by the same interests
that drove the development of petitioning itself—access and information.
A. The Petition Clause Doctrine as Access
The Court first considered substantively the right to petition in Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.240 Noerr involved a
claim that the railroad industry was engaged in anticompetitive conduct in
violation of the Sherman Act241 when it sponsored a publicity campaign to
drum up public opposition to laws that would have favored the trucking
industry.242 Justice Hugo Black, writing for the Court, dismissed the claims,
finding that the Sherman Act, as written, did not apply to this sort of political
activity.243 Justice Black, however, went on to express his concern that if the
Sherman Act were read to reach political activity, it would “raise important
constitutional questions” for the First Amendment and the Petition
Clause.244 While the Court in Noerr never reached the question of whether
the railroads’ activity was protected under the First Amendment,245 Justice
Black’s words have been interpreted to suggest that petitioning includes a
broad range of activities aimed at political advocacy.246
This view was later affirmed in another antitrust case—California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited.247 The California Motor plaintiffs claimed
that their competitors had engaged in monopolization by flooding the courts
and administrative agencies with petitions designed to undermine and drown
out their own license applications.248 The Court first held that the right to
petition extended to petitions submitted to courts and administrative
agencies, and that, as in Noerr, the antitrust laws did not preclude groups from

365 U.S. 127 (1961).
Sherman Act §§ 1–2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (1982).
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 113.
Id. at 138 (“[W]e think it clear that the Sherman Act does not apply to the activities of the
railroads at least insofar as those activities comprised mere solicitation of government action with
respect to the passage and enforcement of laws.”). This holding was affirmed four years later in
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, where the Court found that the Sherman Act likewise did not
reach political activity aimed at the Secretary of Labor and the Tennessee Valley Authority. See 381
U.S. 657, 660-61, 670 (1965). Notably, the Pennington court did not address the First Amendment or
the right to petition.
244 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38.
245 Id. at 132 n.6 (“Because of the view we take of the proper construction of the Sherman Act,
we find it unnecessary to consider [the First Amendment] defenses.”).
246 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1170 (“Justice Black again invoked his understanding of
petitioning as a practice that spanned broadly to encompass any form of legislative advocacy and
communication . . . .”).
247 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
248 Id. at 509.
240
241
242
243
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using these channels.249 Next, however, the Court held that “First
Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation when they are used as
an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute.”250 Thus, attempts
to abuse the formal administrative and judicial processes to anticompetitive
ends were not immune from antitrust liability.251 This has come to be known
as the “sham” exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine under which courts
decline to grant immunity to petitions “aimed at blocking a competitor’s
access to government,”252 rather than genuine efforts at advocacy.253
California Motor recognized the necessity of protecting equal access to both
the courts and administrative agencies. In holding that the First Amendment
protects “the right to access to agencies and courts, within the limits, of course,
of their prescribed procedures,”254 the Court suggests that formal procedures
regulating access are both permissible and often necessary to protect the right
to government access. Moreover, the Court held that, in flooding the courts
and administrative agencies, the highway carriers had sought to deprive their
competitors of “free and meaningful access,”255 thereby drawing a distinction
between “free” and “meaningful” access. While the carriers had not impeded
the “free[dom]” of their competitors to petition the government, they
prevented such petitions from being heard, thus rendering them futile and
meaningless, no less an infringement of the right to petition.256 The Court
made explicit its concern that powerful interests might seek to use the First
Amendment’s protections to infringe upon those of others.257 It affirmed the
principle that First Amendment freedoms do not “sanction repression of that
[same] freedom by private interests.”258 In the lobbying context, where
politically powerful interests compete for scarce lawmaker attention, this
reasoning is particularly resonant and suggests inasmuch as massive lobbying

249 Id. at 510-11 (“We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association and of petition
to hold that groups . . . may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures
of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view . . . .”).
250 Id. at 514.
251 Id. at 513 (noting that such actions “cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge under the
umbrella of ‘political expression’”).
252 McKinley, supra note 9, at 1173 (citing Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 515-16)
253 See Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 515-16.
254 Id. at 515.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. (“A combination of entrepreneurs to harass and deter their competitors from having
‘free and unlimited access’ to the agencies and courts, to defeat that right by massive, concerted, and
purposeful activities of the group are ways of building up one empire and destroying another.”).
258 Id. at 514-15 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
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efforts seek to foreclose meaningful access by other groups they may likewise
be afforded less protection under the First Amendment.259
The Court has generally held that, where a formal channel exists, the right
to petition protects equal access to it.260 Whether the government is under
any obligation to provide a formal channel, and whether the Petition Clause
affords a right to consideration or response, however, are different stories.
The Court first addressed these questions in Arkansas State Highway
Employees, Local 1313 v. Smith.261 Two Arkansas State Highway Commission
employees, having faced disciplinary action, asked their union to file a
grievance on their behalf.262 The commission refused to allow the union to
file grievances on behalf of its members, and the union and employees sued,
arguing that the commission had deprived the union of the right to petition
under the First Amendment.263 Both the district and circuit courts found for
the plaintiffs.264 The Supreme Court, however, reversed, concluding that “the
complaint . . . is simply that the Commission refuses to consider or act upon
grievances when filed by the union rather than by the employee directly,”265
and that, just as the First Amendment did not guarantee that any petition
would be persuasive or effective,266 it imposed no obligation on the
government to listen or respond to the union’s petition.267 The government,
like individuals,268 was free to ignore whatever speech it wanted.
259 The Court has not addressed a situation in which one group has sought to use informal
lobbying to impede another specific group’s right to free and meaningful access. Moreover, the Court
has yet to address the question of whether lobbying is protected at all under the Petition Clause.
However, assuming arguendo that lobbying is a protected form of petition, the “sham” exception
suggests that groups would not be free to use lobbying efforts to foreclose competitor access. Id.
260 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 355 (2010) (discussing the
right of corporations under the First Amendment to petition administrative bodies); First Nat’l Bank
of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792, n.31 (“[T]he First Amendment protects the right of corporations
to petition legislative and administrative bodies.”); Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 510-511 (holding that the
right to petition extends to administrative agencies and their “channels and procedures”).
261 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Ark. State Highway Emps. Local 1315 v. Smith, 585 F.2d 876, 877 (8th Cir. 1978) (citing
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1967)) (holding that
limitations on a union’s ability to seek the assistance of counsel restricts the right to petition).
265 Smith, 441 U.S. at 465.
266 Id. at 464-65 (“[The First Amendment] provides no guarantee that a speech will persuade
or that advocacy will be effective.” (quoting Hanover Twp. Fed’n of Teachers v. Hanover Cmty. Sch.
Corp., 457 F.2d 456, 461 (1972))).
267 Id. at 465.
268 In the individual context, the Court has struck down attempts to restrict unwanted speech
on the basis of an individual’s freedom to ignore it. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (“Recipients of objectionable mailings, however, may ‘effectively avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.’” (quoting Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 21 (1971)); accord id. (“[T]he ‘short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can . . .
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The Court faced a similar set of facts years later in Minnesota State Board
for Community Colleges v. Knight. 269 This case, the converse of Smith, concerned
a Minnesota statute that required public employers to only negotiate with
union representatives on certain matters.270 The statute was challenged by a
group of community college faculty who were barred from participating in
“meet and confer” sessions in their individual capacities, which they alleged
violated their right to petition. 271 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court,
upheld the statute and cited Smith for the proposition that the government is
under no obligation to “listen to any specially affected class than it is to listen
to the public at large. 272 Justice O’Connor also considered what obligation, if
any, the government had to listen to the public generally. Citing Bi-Metallic
Investment Co. v. State Board of Education,273 Justice O’Connor argued that,
just as it would be impractical to recognize a general due process right to be
heard in all instances, requiring the government to consider all voices under
the First Amendment would cause the government to “grind to a halt.” 274 She
also cited several instances in which the government had restricted or limited
public participation, noting that “[p]ublic officials at all levels of government
daily make policy decisions based only on the advice they decide they need
and choose to hear.” 275 Recognizing a constitutional right to be heard, in the
Court’s view, would “work a revolution in existing government practices.”276
It is notable that Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Knight makes no reference to
the history of petitioning or the fact that for hundreds of years the right to
petition included a right to formal consideration and response.277 Indeed, a
broader view of history suggests that the real revolution in government practices
was the gradual erosion of formal participation and subsequent exclusion of the
general public. Such context might also have provided the Court with a limiting
principle to ensure both the public’s right to consideration and the ongoing
functioning of government. Justice O’Connor’s reference to executive agencies
not “permitting unrestricted public testimony”278 calls to mind perhaps the most
widespread form of modern petitioning—the Administrative Procedure Act’s
is an acceptable burden’” (quoting Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880,
883 (S.D.N.Y.), aff ’d 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied 391 U.S. 915 (1968))).
269 465 U.S. 271 (1984).
270 Id. at 273.
271 Id. at 274.
272 Id. at 286-87.
273 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (“Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is
impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption.”).
274 Knight, 465 U.S. at 285.
275 Id. at 284.
276 Id.
277 See supra Section II.A.
278 Knight, 465 U.S. at 284.
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notice-and-comment requirements, which permit widespread public input
limited by formal processes and channels.279 Without such context or a ready
model for a formal means of public participation, however, the Court saw its
choice as one between government efficiency and an unrestricted right to be
heard and chose the former.280
Knight’s sweeping holding is difficult, however, to reconcile with our
emerging understanding of historical petitioning. In We the People Foundation,
Inc. v. United States, the D.C. Circuit considered a claim by an organization
which had engaged in a widespread effort to petition several government
officials—including a member of Congress and various parts of the Executive—
requesting “documented and specific” answers to questions regarding a variety
of public matters, including the tax code, privacy issues, and the government’s
war powers.281 The plaintiffs claimed that, by ignoring their requests and failing
to enter into “good faith exchanges,” these government actors infringed upon
their right to petition.282 While Smith and Knight arose out of the public
employer context and arguably could have been decided on narrower
grounds,283 We the People addressed petitioning in its broadest sense. Writing
for the majority, then-Judge Kavanaugh began by citing Smith and Knight for
the proposition that individuals have no right to consideration.284 In particular,
Judge Kavanaugh noted that neither Smith nor Knight hinted at any limitation
in their holdings to particular types of petition and thus they extended beyond
the public employment context and governed here.285
Judge Kavanaugh proceeded, however, to discuss the wealth of historical
evidence which had emerged in the years following Smith and Knight
suggesting that the right to petition ought to be understood to include a right

See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552–59.
See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1177 (“[T]he [Knight] Court was unable to envision a more
limited form of formal public engagement with the lawmaking process. Consequently, the Court
may have stripped the petition right of one of its core distinctive characteristics—that is, the right
to formal consideration and response . . . .”).
281 We the People Found., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
282 Id. at 141-42.
283 The Smith Court discussed the public employment dimension of the case when considering
the state’s obligations and noted that, while bypassing a union and dealing directly with employees
might constitute an unfair labor practice under federal law, “[t]he First Amendment is not a
substitute for the national labor relations laws.” Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1313 v. Smith, 441
U.S. 463, 464-65 (1979). Moreover, as Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Guarnieri suggests, it may have
been possible to distinguish between petitions submitted to the government as an employer and
petitions submitted to the government as a sovereign. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S.
379, 407 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
284 We the People, 485 F.3d at 143.
285 Id. at 144 (“Nothing in [Smith or Knight] hints at a limitation on their holdings to certain
kinds of petitions or certain levels of Government. In short . . . Smith and Knight govern this case.”).
279
280
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to response or official consideration.286 Ultimately, however, both Judge
Kavanaugh and Judge Rogers agreed that the circuit court was bound by Smith
and Knight.287 The task of reconciling the Petition Clause doctrine with
historical evidence, as Judge Rogers’s concurrence observed, would pose “an
interesting question” for the court.288
At first blush, it is difficult to reconcile the Noerr line of cases, which
identify a right to meaningful access which can be infringed upon by
preventing petitions from being heard, with Smith and Knight, which suggest
that the government is free to infringe upon that right essentially at will.
Indeed, if the carriers in California Motor could collude to deny their
competitors “free and meaningful access” by keeping petitions from being
heard, it seems clear that the government in Smith and Knight, by ignoring
petitions altogether based on their source, had likewise denied the petitioners
“free and meaningful access.”
One important distinction between these cases, however, is the existence
and nature of formal channels. In California Motor, at issue was the carrier’s
free and meaningful access to the courts and administrative agencies, the
formal and appropriate channels for their grievances. In Smith and Knight,
however, the issue was whether the government was obligated to consider
grievances submitted through alternative or informal channels. As Justice
O’Connor noted, in Smith “the government listened only to individual
employees and not to the union,” while in Knight the government met only
“with the union and not with individual employees.”289 Per California Motor,
individuals have a right of access to formal channels, while per Smith and
Knight, there is no general right of access that would require the government
to hear and consider petitions submitted outside those channels.
B. The Petition Clause Doctrine as Information
The Supreme Court has also recognized the important role that petitions
play in providing information to both government officials and the public at
large.290 In Noerr, the conduct complained of was a public advocacy campaign
286 Id. at 144 (noting several examples of commentary on this point, as well as certain
commentators arguing to the contrary); see also id. at 147 (Rogers, J., concurring) (echoing this
sentiment and further emphasizing the “emerging consensus of scholars” embracing a historically
informed interpretation of the right to petition (quoting Lawson & Seidman, supra note 158, at 756)).
287 Id. at 145 (Rogers, J., concurring) (“As the court points out, we have no occasion to resolve
the merits of appellants’ historical argument given the binding Supreme Court precedent . . . .)”.
288 Id. at 149.
289 Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 286-87 (1984).
290 See generally E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129-31
(1961); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 516 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 376-80 (2011).
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aimed at promoting certain laws which would have been unfavorable to the
trucking industry.291 The truckers sued under the Sherman Act, seeking in part
to enjoin the railroads from “disseminating any disparaging information about
the truckers without disclosing railroad participation” and from “attempting
to exert any pressure upon the legislature or Governor.”292 In response, the
railroads asserted their rights under the First Amendment to “inform the
public and legislatures of the several states.”293 While Noerr held only that the
Sherman Act did not reach this sort of political activity, Justice Black’s
majority opinion noted the informational interests at stake, stating that “the
whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to
make their wishes known to their representatives” and that “[t]o hold that the
government retains the power to act in this representative capacity and yet
hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the government
of their wishes . . . would raise important constitutional questions.”294
Justice Black’s majority was not merely concerned with an individual’s
rights, but with the value of information generally. The Court noted that even
if the railroad’s “sole purpose in seeking to influence the passage and
enforcement of laws was to destroy the truckers as competitors,” this would
not alter the analysis, as “[t]he right of the people to inform their
representatives in government of their desires . . . cannot properly be made
to depend upon their intent in doing so.”295 Indeed, even petitions made
purely to secure personal advantage “provide much of the information upon
which governments must act.”296 Accordingly, construing the Sherman Act to
restrain political advocacy would “deprive the government of a valuable
source of information.”297 Years later, California Motor reaffirmed this view of
petitions as promoting both individual rights and government interests, with
Justice Stewart observing that Noerr’s holding was necessary both to “protect
the right of petition guaranteed by the First Amendment” and to “preserve
the informed operation of governmental processes.”298
More recently, the Court has observed how depriving individuals and groups
of the right to petition affects the information available to lawmakers and the
public. In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, the Court considered whether a union
grievance submitted by police officer Charles Guarnieri to his employer was

291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298

See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129-130.
Id. at 131.
Id.
Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 139.
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 516 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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protected under the Petition Clause.299 Lower courts were split over whether
the Petition Clause protected only communications about public matters or
whether it also protected communications that addressed purely private matters,
such as Guarnieri’s employment.300
After reviewing the history of the right to petition,301 Justice Kennedy
clarified the distinction between the right to free speech and the right to
petition, stating that while the right to free speech “fosters [a] public exchange
of ideas,” the right to petition “allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes,
and concerns to their government and their elected representatives.”302 As the
Court in Guarnieri observed, the right to petition not only protects the voice
of political minorities but also ensures that ideas and information from
minorities and other groups are disseminated to the public and to
lawmakers.303 Moreover, the Court noted that public employees like Charles
Guarnieri were “the members of a community most likely to have informed
and definite opinions” about issues relating to their employment, and that the
public at large “has a right to the benefit” of public employees’ participation
in petitioning.304 In particular, the Court noted, petitions may “allow the
public airing of disputed facts” and “promote the evolution of the law by
supporting the development of legal theories.”305
Petitioning, in other words, has value both to the petitioner and to the
lawmaking process at large, and such value “may not accrue if one class of
knowledgeable and motivated citizens is prevented from engaging in
petitioning activity.”306 While the Guarnieri Court here referred specifically
to public employees, this reasoning applies with equal force to all groups,

564 U.S. 379, 382-83 (2011).
Id. at 385 (noting that, while courts in other circuits required an employee’s petition to
relate to a matter of public concern to be protected under the Petition Clause, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals below had rejected this view). Specifically, Guarnieri alleged that his employer
had retaliated against him in response to his grievance, and several lower courts had adopted a
“public concern” requirement for retaliation claims. This requirement has its origins in the Court’s
Free Speech doctrine. See id. at 386 (“If an employee does not speak as a citizen, or does not address
a matter of public concern, ‘a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s
behavior.’” (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983))).
301 Id. at 396.
302 Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
303 See id. at 397 (noting that access to the courts under the Petition Clause provided for the
“contribution of a minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society” (citation omitted)); In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978) (noting that such groups may also “engag[e] in litigation as a vehicle for effective
political expression . . . as well as a means of communicating useful information to the public.”).
304 Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 397 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968)).
305 Id. at 397-98 (quoting BE&K Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Labor Rels. Bd., 536 U.S. 516, 532 (2002)).
306 Id. at 398.
299
300
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particularly political minorities.307 Whenever any segment of society is
excluded from participation in government—whether prevented from
petitioning, ignored by their government, or foreclosed by powerful
interests—the information that group might have provided is excluded as
well, to the public’s detriment.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The history of formal petitioning shows that the Petition Clause does
more than guarantee an individual right to participate in the lawmaking
process. It also serves as a guide for how the government should structure
participation in that process, including how to allocate lawmaker access and
how lawmakers should obtain necessary information. Moreover, as the
previous Part illustrates, the historical interests in access and information are
consistent with the Supreme Court’s Petition Clause jurisprudence.308 While
past legislative efforts at lobbying reform have largely focused on regulating
lobbyists themselves, such as through registration or disclosure
requirements,309 a focus on access and information as important Petition
Clause values suggest a path forward via institutional reforms. In this Part, I
argue that Congress and other legislatures should take affirmative steps to
formalize access, increase institutional support, and bolster public
information gathering mechanisms. Moreover, while past legislative efforts
have struggled to pass constitutional muster under the Speech Clause,310
307 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 420-30 (1963) (holding that the right to petition may be
essential to political minorities who might otherwise be “unable to achieve their objectives through
the ballot [box]” and for whom petitioning “may well be the sole practicable avenue open . . . for
redress of grievances”). While Button was specifically concerned with the right to access to courts
provided under the Petition Clause, the history of petitioning suggests that minority participation
via petitioning is equally characteristic in the legislative and executive branches.
308 See supra Part III.
309 See, e.g., 50 State Chart: Lobbyist Activity Report Requirements, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (May 15, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-lobbyistreport-requirements.aspx [https://perma.cc/JX8K-ZAXX]; Lobbyist Registration Requirements, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-statechart-lobbyist-registration-requirements.aspx [https://perma.cc/T65V-WYEP].
310 See, e.g., Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010) (striking down
a Connecticut law barring campaign contributions by lobbyists); Brinkman v. Budish, 692 F. Supp.
2d 855 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (striking down an Ohio law barring former legislators from lobbying for
one year after leaving service); Lavin v. Husted, 689 F.3d 543 (6th Cir 2012) (striking down an Ohio
statute requiring candidates to refuse campaign contributions from Medicaid providers); Dep’t of
Tex., Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Tex. Lottery Comm’n, 760 F.3d 427 (5th Cir 2014) (striking
down a Texas law prohibiting charities from using bingo proceeds for lobbying purposes); Citizens
Union of New York v. Att’y Gen. of N.Y., 408 F. Supp. 3d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (striking down a New
York statute imposing greater disclosure requirements on organizations engaged in lobbying efforts);
Mkay Inc. v. City of Huntington Park, No. 17-01467, 2018 WL 3830011 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2018)
(granting summary judgment and holding unconstitutional a city ordinance that prohibited lobbying
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institutional reforms such as these would be more easily defended under an
independent Petition Clause doctrine rooted in historical context. Such a
doctrine, I argue, should more explicitly affirm the government’s interests in
promoting equitable access to government and in providing lawmakers with
broad and inclusive information and should also recognize these as important
rationales for regulation under the Petition Clause
A. Implications for Institutional Reform
To fully realize the right to petition’s promise, institutional reform is
necessary. A lack of institutional support for petitioning helped contribute to
the rise of our current lobbying system.311 Creating new formal mechanisms
for engagement would not only better comport with the history of the right
to petition, but it would also help to draw a distinction between those formal
processes which the right to petition protects and those informal attempts at
access not protected.312 A focus on petitioning’s historical context also
provides lawmakers with an opportunity to develop new systems of public
engagement to account for the dramatic changes in attention scarcity and
lawmakers’ information needs that have occurred since the Founding.
1. Avenues for Institutional Change
First and foremost, Congress and state legislatures should establish, either
by rule or by statute, formal procedures for petitioning and public
engagement with lawmakers. While these procedures would likely differ in
some ways from their historical counterparts—they might not, for example,
insist upon a formal prayer for relief—they should be crafted with access and
information interests in mind. Access should be egalitarian, with submissions
received on equal footing without respect to their source, and in keeping with
the history of petitioning, all submissions should be guaranteed
consideration, if not also response.
Such a system would provide a way to allocate government access by
regulating the procedures through which individuals and groups
communicate with government officials without restricting the content of
those communications or who may submit them. Creating a formal system
would also draw a clear distinction between a formal channel protected by the
members of the city regarding applications for medical marijuana permits); Autor v. Pritzker, 740
F.3d 176 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking down a Department of Commerce regulation banning lobbyists
from serving on certain advisory commissions).
311 See supra Section II.C.
312 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1199 (arguing that, by embracing our current lobbying system, which
does not provide for meaningful procedural guarantees and does afford a meaningful voice for minorities in
the lawmaking process, Congress has violated the right to petition); see also supra Section III.A.
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Petition Clause and informal attempts at access which could be further
regulated to the extent that they seek to circumvent or undermine formal
procedures.313 A formal system would also have the added benefit of collecting
all submissions in one place and creating a record to which lawmakers could
refer as a source of information.
Second, to ensure equitable access given limited lawmaker attention, new
mechanisms must be created to manage the volume of petitions. History offers
several methods for dealing with a large number of petitions. Congress has
established administrative agencies and specialized courts in part to receive
and consider petitions within specific subject areas.314 Inside Congress, large
numbers of similar petitions historically were consolidated, and frivolous
petitions were summarily dismissed.315 Those petitions which did reach the
congressional floor would then be referred to committees in order to grant
them due consideration without occupying the attention of the entire body.316
New approaches will also be necessary in order to realize the right to
petition’s promise of equal access and consideration, including the use of new
technology to make petitioning more widely and easily available. Since the
early 2000s, for example, administrative agencies have increasingly shifted
notice and comment rulemaking online,317 greatly expanding the public’s
ability to participate in the rulemaking process.318 This has, in turn, impacted
the decisionmaking process. In 2014, for example, e-rulemaking enabled the
public to submit 3.9 million comments as part of the Federal
Communications Commission’s proposed Net Neutrality order.319 The
resulting 2015 Open Internet Order320 was heavily influenced by those

313 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1200 (suggesting that informal lobbying efforts could be regulated
“through disclosure and ethics rules, including recusal rules similar to those that govern judges”).
314 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1200 (“Congress dealt with problems of volume historically
be creating much of the administrative state and specialized courts, including the Patent and
Trademark Office and the Court of Claims . . . .”).
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 See, e.g., John M. de Figueiredo, E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal
Communications Commission, 55 DUKE L.J. 969, 992 (2006) (“[T]his analysis has found . . . a longterm trend from paper to electronic filings.”).
318 See Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing Regulation, Digitally, DEMOCRACY J., Fall 2014,
http://www.democracyjournal.org/34/democratizing-regulation-digitally [https://perma.cc/2D2UN3H2 ] (noting that “[d]emocratic participation is built into the very idea of notice-and-comment
rule-making” and that, thanks to electronic rulemaking, “we are finally starting to realize the full
potential of the rule-making process”).
319 See Lauren Moxley, E-Rulemaking and Democracy, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 661, 690 (2016) (noting
that this number of comments was made possible due to the ability to submit comments online).
320 See Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) (codified at
scattered sections of 47 C.F.R.).
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comments.321 Several proposals for a similar online system for petitioning
Congress have been made,322 and while an online petition system would no
doubt bring its own technical challenges,323 it is likely that such a system
would be necessary in order to handle the volume of petitions submitted and
to ensure that they are organized in such a way as to be capable of receiving
meaningful consideration.
Finally, the government should actively encourage and facilitate public
participation as part of an active information-gathering process, as opposed
to taking participation as a given. Congress and state legislatures should
support and expand public information-gathering sources in order to provide
nonpartisan independent expertise on complex policy issues. The
administrative state provides ready examples of agencies filled with highly
specialized career experts who are tasked with providing independent
research and information to policymakers.324 Similarly, Congress’s internal
bureaucracy of nonpartisan expert institutions—including the Congressional
Research Service and the Office of Budget and Management, among
others325—was developed in part to provide lawmakers with a similar source
of independent expertise as the executive branch, but has in recent years seen
support dwindle.326 Reinvesting in and expanding public informationgathering institutions such as these would help provide lawmakers with more
complete information and thus reduce the need to rely on private interests.
321 See Moxley, supra note 319, at 685-93 (describing in detail how the 2015 Open Internet Order
incorporated multiple elements and views from the comments received).
322 See, e.g., Lee Drutman, A Better Way to Fix Lobbying, 40 ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE STUD. 1,
6-10 (2011) (proposing JAMES, an online petitioning system which would permit members of the
public to submit comments to pieces of draft legislation); Richa Mishra, Frontiers of Democracy
Research: A Fresh Perspective on Lobbying and Political Access, HARV. ASH CTR. FOR DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE & INNOVATION: CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY (Aug. 5, 2014),
https://medium.com/challenges-to-democracy/frontiers-of-democracy-research-a-fresh-perspectiveon-lobbying-and-political-access-b1c552e09a4b [https://perma.cc/R8R8-EXBV] (discussing the
Madison Project, a legislative engagement platform developed as part of a “hack-a-thon” held within
the House of Representatives which was used to crowd-source amendments to a bill as part of the
first ever “crowdsourced” markup process).
323 In particular, online systems for submitting comments have struggled to address fake
comments submitted by automated processes. These often make use of stolen identities to attempt
to influence policymaking, and in some cases extremely large volumes of comments are sent in an
attempt to overload the system and disrupt the notice and comment process. See, e.g., STAFF OF S.
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 116TH CONG., REP. ON ABUSES OF THE
FEDERAL NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING PROCESS, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/2019-10-24%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20-%20Abuses%20of%20the%20Federal%20
Notice-and-Comment%20Rulemaking%20Process.pdf [https://perma.cc/PD8Z-8LB4].
324 See, e.g., Cross & Gluck, supra note 67, at 1544-45 (noting nine nonpartisan legislative
institutions, including the Congressional Research Service, that provide such information).
325 Id. at 1544-45, 1573
326 Id. at 1546; Drutman & Teles, supra note 65 (describing how support for these institutions
has declined in recent decades).
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Expertise, however, is not a silver bullet. As the history of petitioning
illustrates, the public itself is a vital source of information that can help
supplement expert advice and draw attention to important issues that might
otherwise be overlooked.327 Moving forward, any new system of public
engagement should strive to solicit information from the public and incorporate
it into the decisionmaking process. The Administrative Procedure Act’s noticeand-comment procedure, for example, leverages public participation as a source
of valuable information that often serves to correct agency errors and
oversights.328 Creating a similar system for public participation in the legislative
process would help fill information gaps, with petitions raising new concerns
and comments supplementing independent expertise.
2. Objections
The reforms suggested above may be subject to two general criticisms.
First is the question of feasibility—whether given the demands on lawmaker
attention, the ever-increasing torrent of information from competition
interest groups, and the expansion of the government’s role a formal
mechanism of public engagement is even possible. Indeed, as discussed above,
formal petitioning declined in part because formal mechanisms were unable to
keep up with the sheer volume of petitions.329 As Professor Blackhawk notes,
however, such feasibility concerns have been resolved before in the lower
federal courts and in administrative agencies, both of which have successfully
scaled alongside the growth of the American population and the expansion of
federal jurisdiction.330 Moreover, she observes, our current lobbying system is
already a multi-billion dollar industry, and Congress and other legislatures
every day invest resources into allocating access and obtaining information.331
Second is the question of efficacy. That is, even if formal channels were
established, what is there to stop lawmakers from simply ignoring them and
continuing to engage with lobbyists informally? One response is that a formal
system could be accompanied by stricter regulations on informal access,
including disclosure requirements and ethics rules. Another is that the creation
of a formal system of public engagement would make clear the distinction
between appropriate and inappropriate means of access and thus make it much
easier for the public to hold accountable any lawmakers who choose to
See supra Section II.B.
See Sunstein, supra note 318 (observing that “[d]emocratization of the regulatory process,
through public comment, has an epistemic value” and that where an “agency has inaccurately
assessed costs and benefits, public participation can and often will supply a corrective”).
329 See supra Section II.C.
330 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1201-02.
331 Id.
327
328
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circumvent formal procedures.332 But even accepting the cynical position that
some lawmakers would continue to afford lobbyists informal access,
establishing formal procedures would still ensure that some lawmaker access
is allocated more equitably and that more of the information lawmakers act
upon is obtained from sources other than lobbyists.
B. Doctrinal Implications
The most significant obstacle facing any attempt at lobbying reform is a
potential First Amendment challenge. As Professor Hasen has noted, where
lobbying is treated as a form of political speech, legislative approaches to
lobbying reform are often subject to strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment, requiring that measures be narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling government interest.333 Traditionally, lower courts have upheld a
variety of lobbying regulations under the First Amendment, even under strict
scrutiny, based on either an anticorruption or an antidistortion rationale.334
Following the Supreme Court’s sweeping campaign finance decision in
Citizens United in 2010, however, these rationales have struggled in the lower
courts.335 The Supreme Court’s invitation in Guarnieri to more fully consider
Id. at 1200-01.
See Hasen, supra note 8, at 214-16 (discussing various applications of the strict scrutiny
standard in First Amendment cases regarding legislation banning or regulating lobbyists).
334 See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999) (upholding a North
Carolina ban on lobbyist contributions to legislators under strict scrutiny); Preston v. Leake, 743 F.
Supp. 2d 501 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (upholding a ban on lobbyist contributions under closely drawn
scrutiny), aff ’d 660 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 2011); Inst. of Governmental Advocs. v. Fair Pol. Pracs.
Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (upholding a ban on lobbyist contributions to
candidates for certain offices under closely drawn scrutiny); State v. Alaska C.L. Union, 978 P.2d
597 (Alaska 1999) (upholding a ban on lobbyist contributions to legislators outside of the lobbyist’s
home district under closely drawn scrutiny); Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44 (Vt. 1995) (upholding
a Vermont ban on lobbyist contributions to legislators during legislative sessions); Fla. League of
Prof ’l Lobbyists v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding a ban on lobbying
contingency fees); Associated Indus. of Ky. v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Ky. 1995)
(same); United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1973) (upholding a statute imposing
restrictions on former lawmakers entering the lobbying industry); Md. Right to Life State Political
Action Comm. v. Weathersbee, 975 F. Supp. 791, 797 (D. Md. 1997) (upholding a ban on lobbyists
serving on political fundraising committees after applying strict scrutiny). But see Fair Pol. Pracs.
Comm’n v. Superior Court, 599 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1979) (striking down a ban on lobbyist contributions
to all state elected officials under closely drawn scrutiny); Mont. Auto. Ass’n v. Greely 632 P.2d 300,
308 (Mont. 1981) (striking down a Montana statute barring lobbying contingency fees under the
First Amendment); see also Hasen, supra note 8, at 210-12 (discussing three different opinions on the
intersection between tax law and lobbying law).
335 See, e.g., Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010) (striking down
portions of a Connecticut law barring lobbyists from contributing to lawmakers or collecting funds
on their behalf after rejection an anti-corruption rationale); Brinkman v. Budish, 692 F. Supp. 2d
855 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (applying strict scrutiny and striking down a law barring former state assembly
members from lobbying after rejecting an anti-corruption rationale); see also Hasen, supra note 8, at
332
333
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the right to petition in its historical context, however, suggests an alternative
path forward under an independent Petition Clause doctrine. The history of
formal petitioning suggests that the government may have a compelling
interest in allocating government access and in providing lawmakers with
information. Thus, while direct restrictions on lobbying might implicate the
Speech Clause, the structural and institutional reforms described above
would be much more easily defended under an independent Petition Clause
doctrine informed by this history.
1. Distinguishing the Right to Petition from the Right to Free Speech
In Guarnieri, the Supreme Court recognized that the right to petition is
distinct from the right to speech and should be interpreted according to its
underlying “objectives and aspirations.”336 Since then, lower courts have
struggled to divine those objectives and aspirations and the extent to which
traditional speech clause analysis should apply to petition cases.337 But as the
history of petitioning demonstrates, speech and petition implicate wholly
different sets of values which, if taken seriously, would form the foundation
of a distinct Petition Clause doctrine.
Many of the core values of the Court’s Free Speech doctrine are a poor fit
for the concerns raised by petitioning and government access. For example, a
major concern of much of the twentieth century’s speech jurisprudence was
213-16 (describing the post-Citizens United treatment of lobbying regulations in the lower courts). It
is worth noting, however, that it is unclear to what degree the Court’s campaign finance
jurisprudence is a good fit with lobbying. For an in-depth discussion on this point, see McKinley,
supra note 9, at 1190-93.
336 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388 (2011).
337 While lower courts have generally accepted Guarnieri’s holding that speech doctrine is not
per se applicable to the petition context, the relatively narrow holding of that case has provided little
guidance. See, e.g., Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641, 654-55 (3d Cir., 2017) (noting that, while
Guarnieri clarified that courts may not “automatically” apply Speech Clause precedent to petition
cases, the case did not “forge new ground under the Petition Clause”). Taking guidance from the
Guarnieri Court’s decision to nonetheless apply the public concern doctrine, some lower courts have
continued to import speech doctrine to petition cases. See id. at 655 (applying free speech precedent
“as the Supreme Court did in Guarnieri” to a petition case and noting that it’s analysis would be
“identical if [the plaintiffs] had framed their argument as a free speech claim, rather than a violation
of their right to petition the government”). Other courts, however, have declined to import other
tests from the free speech doctrine based on Guarnieri’s limited discussion of the differences between
speech and petition. See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 31-32 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that
the right to gather facts and to speak in the process of preparing a petition is “more naturally the
province of the Speech and Press Clauses than of the Petition Clause”); see also Leuthy v. LePage,
No. 17-00296, 2018 WL 4134628, at *16 (D. Me. 2018) (quoting from Guarnieri that “[p]etitions to
the government assume an added dimension when they seek to advance political, social, or other
ideas of interest to the community as a whole” and holding that individuals blocked from a
government official’s social media count had successfully stated distinct claims under both the
Speech and Petition Clauses).
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the role that free speech played in promoting public debate and democratic
deliberation.338 In the “marketplace of ideas” model, the First Amendment’s
protection of free speech fosters discussion and deliberation, allowing ideas
to rise or fall on the basis of their truth and persuasiveness alone.339 Famously,
in such a model, the remedy for false or objectionable speech is not regulation,
but deliberation—that is, “more speech.”340
As Professor Wu has observed, however, this vision of political speech
relies on the flawed assumption that listeners have the time and ability to hear
and be influenced by the different ideas in the market.341 With the rise of the
Internet and the explosive proliferation of speech, however, there is simply
too much information for any individual to consume, let alone consider.342 In
a finite body such as Congress, this effect is magnified.343 If scarce lawmaker
attention is the problem, then “more lobbying” simply cannot be the remedy,
and indeed it is already the case that lawmakers pick and choose whom to
listen to and whom to ignore, albeit informally. Likewise, if informationgathering is a core Petition Clause value, this suggests that the information
lawmakers have available to them should not be left up to market-like forces.
The “marketplace of ideas” model also assumes that government
intervention is the primary threat to the free flow of ideas and that, left alone,
the marketplace will take care of itself.344 In the context of petitioning or
lobbying, this assumption fails on two grounds. First, as California Motor and
the Noerr-Pennington line of cases demonstrates, private parties are quite able
to infringe upon the exercise of the right to petition.345 Indeed, given the
scarcity of lawmaker attention, every successful effort to have one’s client
heard necessarily comes at the expense of other groups. Second, the
government cannot stay out of the “marketplace” of lobbying and petitioning
because it is the government’s attention that is being sought. Whether the
338 See, e.g., Rodney Smolla, The Meaning of the “Marketplace of Ideas” in First Amendment Law,
24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 437, 438-42 (2019) (noting that “[t]he marketplace of ideas metaphor has
been invoked constantly by the Supreme Court justices in First Amendment cases” and noting
several examples).
339 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1-7
(summarizing the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor as attributed to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes);
United States v. Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”).
340 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (“The remedy for speech that is false is
speech that is true.”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (J. Brandeis, concurring) (“If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies . . . the remedy to be applied
is more speech . . . .”).
341 See Wu, supra note 32, at 553-54.
342 Id. at 554-55.
343 See supra notes 42–57 and accompanying text.
344 See Wu, supra note 32, at 554.
345 See supra notes 240–259 and accompanying text.
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government uses a formal and institutionalized petition process or an
informal lobbying system, it nonetheless makes decisions about how to
allocate its attention, which unavoidably results in winners and losers.
If we take seriously the right to petition’s allocative and informational
dimensions, it becomes apparent that the right to petition not only permits some
government intervention, but may in fact require it.346 Just as protecting one’s
procedural right of due process in a court of law requires the government to
afford access and to define a process by which parties may by heard, so too would
a proceduralist right to petition require the government to establish a formal
mechanism and to take steps to ensure that mechanism is not circumvented.347
The right to petition’s interests in access and information distinguish it from the
right to free speech and should inform the development of a distinct Petition
Clause doctrine that would delineate between expressions protected by the Free
Speech Clause and those protected by the Petition Clause.348
2. New Rationales for Regulation
Even if petitions continue to be considered under the Speech Clause, or if
the Court decides to incorporate Speech precedents into the Petition Clause
doctrine, access and information interests could still inform the Court’s
analysis as new rationales for government regulation and reform. Moreover,
while past attempts at restricting lobbying directly have struggled under strict
scrutiny,349 the institutional reforms advocated here would not restrict speech
and would likely be easier to defend under these new rationales.
First, the history of petitioning suggests that the government has a
compelling interest in the equitable allocation of government access. That is,
the government has an interest in ensuring that the lawmaking process
remains open to political minorities and that powerful interests are not able
to foreclose access to others by virtue of their wealth or influence.
In the campaign finance context, the Supreme Court has rejected attempts
to justify restrictions on political spending in the interest of “leveling the
playing field,” or otherwise combatting the distorting effect of money in
politics.350 At first blush, then, it would seem odd to suggest that the right to
346 See McKinley, supra note 9, at 1184 n.384 (arguing that a proceduralist view of petitioning would
require “rights-based limitations” and also “mechanisms of participation . . . in the lawmaking process”).
347 Id. at 1133 (illustrating how the informality of our current lobbying system, if exhibited in
our court system, would “deeply offend our notions of the right to due process”).
348 Id. at 1188 n.402 (laying out one potential model for this disaggregation in which advocacy
directed at the public would fall under the Speech Clause, while advocacy directed to government
through formal channels would fall under the Petition Clause).
349 See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
350 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364-66 (2010) (overruling
past precedents which had recognized a compelling antidistortion interest).
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petition’s access interest should pass constitutional muster. But these two
interests differ in three ways. First, while the anti-distortion rationale rejected
in Citizens United was focused on the “political marketplace” of elections, 351 the
right to petition is by definition confined to the lawmaking context, where the
“marketplace of ideas” model is a poor fit.352 Second, while the anti-distortion
rationale focused on limiting campaign spending and thus expression, this
rationale focuses on access, not expression. Smith and Knight are illustrative
here: in both cases, the statutes upheld in no way infringed upon the
petitioner’s ability to spend money on petitions or the content of those petitions
and focused instead on which petitions the government would agree to
consider.353 Third, the right to petition’s access interest is procedural, and as the
Court in Citizens United affirmed, cases like Noerr and California Motor expressly
protect the quasi-procedural right to meaningful access to courts and
administrative bodies where formal channels exist.354 A legislative approach
that seeks to ensure equal access by all parties could hardly be seen to run afoul
of the First Amendment, even if it would have the practical effect of reducing
the share of lawmaker attention that goes to politically powerful interests.
The history of petitioning also suggests that the government has a
compelling interest in providing lawmakers with broad and inclusive
information. Information is a prerequisite to effective lawmaking, and the
Supreme Court has generally favored disclosure requirements in part because
they contribute to, rather than restrict, the flow of information.355 This has
been the case both with respect to lobbying and campaign finance.356 The
Court has also upheld the ability of Congress to issue subpoenas and hold
hearings to collect information.357 And cases like California Motor and
Guarnieri affirm the role that petitions play in providing lawmakers with
information. Perhaps more important than the doctrinal precedent here is the
legislative precedent. The Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and
See id. at 350.
See supra notes 338–345 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 260–276 and accompanying text.
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 355 (“[T]he First Amendment protects the right of
corporations to petition legislative and administrative bodies.” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellottii, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.31 (1978))); E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961)); see also supra notes 241–253 and accompanying text.
355 See, e.g., Trevor Potter, Buckley v. Valeo, Political Disclosure and the First Amendment, 33 AKRON
L. REV. 71, 71 (1999) (“Generally, disclosure enjoys a favored position, and is said by the Supreme Court
to advance, rather than restrict, the information available in the marketplace of ideas.”).
356 Compare United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625-26 (1954) (upholding a lobbying
disclosure regime because it provided information to lawmakers without prohibiting speech), with
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-67 (upholding a campaign finance disclosure regime because it
provided information to voters without prohibiting speech).
357 See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959); Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
351
352
353
354
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comment provisions, for example, do more than simply provide the public
with a way to give input on proposed regulations; they also generate a broad
and inclusive record upon which decisions are to be made.358 Similar
structural reforms aimed at Congress or other legislatures would likewise
further lawmakers’ interest in information-gathering.
CONCLUSION
The history of formal petitioning reveals that the right to petition
protects more than simply a form of political expression. Rather, it protects
a right to participate in the lawmaking process. The formal procedures that
characterized petitioning in Parliament, colonial governments, and Congress
provided individuals and groups with a quasi-procedural right to access
legislative bodies and to have their petitions considered on equal footing. In
return, petitions provided lawmakers with broad and inclusive information
necessary for effective governance. These two interests—access and
information—were central to petitioning, and as the institutions that
supported formal petitioning declined, these same interests spurred the rise
of our modern lobbying system.
Attempts to reform our lobbying system raise foundational questions
under the First Amendment, requiring foundational solutions. Whereas past
efforts at regulating lobbying have focused on the speech and activity of
lobbyists themselves, the history of petitioning invites us to view the problem
from an institutional perspective. Moving forward, Congress and state
legislatures should consider the history of the right to petition as a guide for
allocating government access and as a mechanism for generating broad and
inclusive information. Likewise, the Supreme Court should employ this
history in developing a distinct Petition Clause doctrine that recognizes the
ongoing importance of access and information. By taking seriously these
interests, the right to petition’s vision of a formal, equal, and informative
system of public engagement can be more fully realized.

358

5 U.S.C. § 553.
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